The election result is an ideal stress test for the form of government. S, V, MP and C gather 176 mandates, but the Left Party's congressional decision not to let forward any government that the party is not part of clashes head-on with the Center Party's decision to vote no to every government in which the Left Party has ministers. The right's 173 mandates can calmly await the opponent's collapse.
It is, in game theory terms, a pure "chicken race". No one wants to blink first, because the cost is perceived by their own voters to be higher than the cost of nothing happening.
To understand why the lockdown does not resolve itself, you have to go back to 1974. When the form of government was written, Sweden was a two bloc country. The voters decided on election night who would move into Rosenbad, and the speaker's job was to formally confirm the result. The principle of negative parliamentarism - a prime minister is approved unless at least 175 members vote against it - was intended to make power shifts smooth and government crises short.
When the form of government was written, Sweden was a two bloc country. Voters decided on election night who would move into Rosenbad, and the Speaker's job was to formally confirm the result
In today's fragmented Riksdag, the same principle does the opposite. A prime minister can be released on Monday and be without the opportunity to govern on Tuesday. Since the budget reform in 1996, the state's finances are decided by a single indivisible framework decision, and losing it means in practice administering the policies of the opponents. So it is not enough to find someone who is tolerated. The base must also carry a budget.
In countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium, deadlocks are resolved by impartial mediators appointed by the head of state. The form of government does not permit such a thing. The Speaker is left alone in the room, as judge, process manager and instigator all at once. This applies regardless of who the Riksdag elects as Speaker on Monday. The task is the same no matter who is sitting on the chair.
The formation of the government in 2018 was the turning point. For 134 days, the speaker was forced to improvise a new role as active process leader. What was then improvised now needs to become an established working method.
The formation of the government in 2018 was the turning point. For 134 days, the speaker was forced to improvise a new role as active process manager
As long as extra elections feel distant, it does not affect anyone. The Speaker's most important task is therefore to make the threat concrete. The form of government gives four attempts before by-elections are automatically triggered. By trying early on a candidate the Speaker knows will be voted down – and letting V's and C's incompatible lines clash in the open chamber – the playing field shrinks. On the third and fourth ballots, the trigger point for by-elections is suddenly just a couple of weeks away. Only then are the locks re-examined.
The second tool is to refuse to split the negotiation. If the prime minister issue is decided first and the budget second, each supporting party has an incentive to release the government and then use the budget as blackmail. The Speaker should therefore not nominate someone who cannot show a binding written agreement that also covers the framework decision.
The January agreement and the Tidö agreement show what is required. The Tidö agreement bound the entire basis and extended the term of office. The January agreement lasted two and a half years but fell in the summer of 2021, precisely because the party whose votes the government needed was outside the agreement and could exploit it. An agreement that leaves out any of the necessary parties only postpones the problem.
The third is how the agreement is constructed. A sustainable agreement between V and C must intertwine the parties' gains so that whoever brings down the government or the budget simultaneously erases their own victories. The Speaker does not dictate policy, but should demand that the government-former demonstrate such a self-disciplining structure before the proposal goes to the House.
All of this is moving on a tightrope. A speaker who is too active risks being perceived as a political actor rather than a constitutional guardian, which the constitutional committee may review afterwards. But the alternative is worse.
The framers of the Constitution in 1974 built one of the world's most stripped-down systems of government formation in the belief that restraint would suffice. That belief no longer holds. Without a Speaker actively driving the process, negative parliamentarism turns from a smooth path to power into a constitutional impasse.
Read more articles from DN Debatt:
Lars-Johan Åge, professor of negotiation and mediation: "The most important thing is not who won the election - but what they have to sacrifice"
