ROME – A nail planted in the wrong place is no longer enough to explain the blackout that paralyzed Rome Termini on October 2, 2024, causing delays and cancellations throughout Italy. Behind the collapse there were insufficient alarms, incomplete backup systems, an anomaly not detected by the technicians and even an internal procedure that remained unapplied.
These shortcomings, evidence of "serious negligence", cost the Italian Railway Network (the FS company that manages the tracks and stations) a fine of one million and 750 thousand euros.
The fine is decided by the Transport Authority with resolution number 163 of 2026. RFI, a company of the FS Group that manages the national network, will have to pay within thirty days. You can lodge an appeal with the Piedmont Regional Administrative Court within sixty days or an extraordinary appeal within 120 days.
At 1.30
The accident began at 1.30 am, when a contractor company damaged an electrical cable during some work, in Termini. Emergency technicians were notified at 1.45 am and arrived on site at 2.20 am. The compromised power line, powered by Acea, is deactivated.
But no one detects the blockage of the "logic" (of the computer board) inside the medium and low voltage cabin. Yet that very block will prevent the automatic transition to the second power supply, the reserve one, which is instead ready and available.
Not even the generator comes into operation. The system detects (erroneously) that the situation is under control. He takes the medium voltage railway power supply for granted, despite the blocking of the "logic" of the cabin preventing the reserve current from reaching the equipment.
Continuity batteries
In the end, only the continuity batteries keep the system alive. Here's a new anomaly. Their activation is not reported due to a further fault. So the batteries run out at 6.20am (without anyone having understood the gravity of the situation) just as the busiest commuter traffic period begins.
At that point - when there are no more cards to play - the technological systems that govern traffic in Rome Termini and Rome Tiburtina are turned off. The emergency was declared at 6.30 am. At 8.50 the first systems are re-powered and reconnected. Full functionality returns at 9.15am, but the consequences continue until late afternoon with an impact on travelers that the Authority now defines as "very serious".
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59 minutes each
According to the first reconstruction transmitted by RFI, 1,165 trains were involved, which accumulated a total of 69,267 minutes of delay: on average 59 minutes each. There were 680 suppressions, of which 476 total and 204 partial. Another 31 convoys were diverted from Rome Termini. The inconveniences affected regional trains, high speed trains, Intercity trains and also freight traffic.
In this regard, the Authority explains that the chain failures have damaged "the constitutional right to passenger mobility", but have also damaged other transport companies, such as Italo, which must rely on the "full and correct availability of the railway infrastructure".
Chain failures, sure. Between 6.20 and 8 in Termini not even the billboards and sound announcements work. In Tiburtina the monitors remain turned off, while at least they continue to work: the speakers. RFI sends staff to the stations and slows down the influx towards Rome: trains coming from Florence and Naples are routed on conventional lines, while numerous services are cancelled, limited or confirmed in other systems.
However, the resolution does not attribute the accident to the SIM cards without credit inserted in the alarm control units, a hypothesis that circulated in the months following the blackout. RFI has always denied that the failure was attributable to this circumstance.
Inadequate alerts
The Authority's complaint focuses on different elements: the absence or failure to function of adequate alarms, the lack of reserve logical devices (which come into operation when the main ones are in haywire), the delay in identifying the cabin block and the non-application of a specific internal procedure of the RFI itself.
This last element is also detected by Ansfisa, the National Agency for railway safety. The Agency found no violations of traffic safety regulations or mandatory technical standards. However, he confirmed that a procedure had not been applied that requires alarms relating to malfunctions of the power systems to be reported to the managers' offices (away from the chaos).
RFI rejected the accusation of negligence. During the proceedings, he argued that the blackout was a "mere fault" caused by an unpredictable action (by the contractor, engaged in night work) and subsequently managed adequately and quickly.
Even today, with the sanction decided, RFI reiterates that it has promptly implemented all the necessary measures to guarantee the resumption of traffic.
The crux of competence
The company recalled that it had redistributed the residual railway capacity without discrimination between the companies (Trenitalia, Italo) and even contested the Authority's competence to intervene on aspects that it considers of a technical-operational nature. He also underlined that the Ministry of Infrastructure, after receiving a report on the accident, had not made any objections.
But the Authority rejected these defenses. The fine, he specifies, does not arise from simple damage to the cable. It originates from the inability of the system set up by RFI to contain the effects of the fault. A complex infrastructure can be affected by electrical anomalies or errors during work. But precisely for this reason, the Authority observes, it must have alarms, procedures and alternative systems capable of guaranteeing continuity of service.
The empowerment
The fine could have reached two million euros because the Authority recognized the repetition of the violation, recalling two previous measures against RFI in 2023 and 2025.
