Germany is arming itself, the AfD is gaining influence: Foreign policy expert Liana Fix explains how Europe can arm itself against the German military being used in an anti-democratic manner.
Bundeswehr soldiers from the Lithuanian Armored Brigade: Germany's rearmament is generally welcomed. Photo: IMAGO
Photo: CFR
Brussels. Ms. Fix, Germany is massively rearming, and at the same time a party, the AfD, is gaining share of the vote, some of whose attitudes violate the Basic Law. Neighboring countries such as Poland and France are concerned. Rightly so?
In fact, there are many concerned reactions. One wonders what the rise of the AfD means for Germany's future role in Europe and its military power. This does not mean that Germany's rearmament is rejected, on the contrary: it is necessary and overdue - in view of the US withdrawal and the growing threat from Russia. The upgrade is therefore generally welcomed.
But Poland's Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski also says that he remembers all too well "where a rearmed Germany in the hands of a right-wing extremist, pro-Russian party can lead."
There are two problems. Firstly, Germany could become very dominant in Europe even under a centrist government - with such a defense budget and its still extremely strong, sometimes problematic economic position. Secondly, there is the question of what happens if the AfD gains access to power.
What would be the solution?
In my view, there is a historical answer to both problems: Germany must integrate its military power more closely into Europe. The question of how German growth in power can be regulated was raised as early as 1955 when the Bundeswehr was set up and again during reunification in 1990. The answer from German politicians was always greater European integration: the Bundeswehr was placed under the command of NATO, Helmut Kohl agreed to the euro - the “golden handcuffs” in return for an increase in German power in Europe. That must be the answer now too.
Vita Liana Fix
Liana Fix is a Europe expert at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank in Washington and adjunct professor at Georgetown University. She received her doctorate in political science in Gießen and was program manager at the Körber Foundation for several years, which implements projects on international and European politics and international understanding. She now researches German foreign policy, Russia and transatlantic relations.
Fix’s new book “Germany Rearmed” was published in August. She describes how Germany is returning to rearmament after eight decades of military restraint - and what that means for Europe's security order.
What could stronger European integration look like today?
First, Germany could become the paymaster of European rearmament and enable rearmament not only for itself but also for other countries through European debt. Germany is currently largely resisting this. Second, European armies and military capabilities could cooperate more closely in multinational formations. Third, the defense industries could be more integrated. This is not happening at the moment because of course German jobs should also be created.
So there are a lot of competing interests here. Why try to overcome them?
It would be a kind of insurance against the AfD. Of course, the party could undo this if they wanted. But it would be more difficult - especially for joint defense projects with contracts that run for ten or 20 years and cannot be easily terminated. This does not make Germany's military power "AfD-proof", but it would make it more difficult for the AfD to remove Germany from European integration.
Friedrich Merz with Bundeswehr officers: The Chancellor is calling on other European countries to spend more on defense. Photo: IMAGO/Chris Emil Janßen
Which measure would tie the hands of an AfD government the most?
A European defense industry and a more Europeanized defense. It would be very difficult for the AfD to pull Germany out of this. But it would be more feasible and easier - also in the tradition of German policymaking - to throw money at the problem: Germany should be open to an expansion of European debt. In this way, not only we, but also other European countries that lack their own financial flexibility could upgrade.
It is currently primarily Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz who is opposing higher debt in the EU.
Yes. But you can't just stand there and say - as in the financial crisis - you have to spend more on defense, and if you can't do that, that's your problem. In the end, it is also Germany's problem if it stays out of the picture and portrays itself as a thrifty Swabian housewife while the others are left high and dry.
The mood among the population regarding the defense industry seems to be at least mixed. The AfD gains reinforce the impression that some voters are tired of measures supporting Ukraine in Russia's war of aggression and that being friendly to Russia is winning votes. Could other parties adopt this attitude?
I believe the majority in the country continues to support Ukraine. Russia is not extending a hand to Germany. On the contrary: it is escalating in a way that is intended to spread fear and terror and force German neutralism - that is, to get Germany to stay out of it.
Is the federal government doing enough about it?
The brigade in Lithuania with 5,000 soldiers, for example, is an insurance policy here. It is intended to prevent political cowardice: in the event of an escalation, you couldn't evacuate 5,000 soldiers and their families so quickly, even if you wanted to. This is important. The Left Party likes to argue: If rearmament can fall into the hands of the AfD, we'd better leave it alone. But these are not the right alternatives.
Can NATO function if democratically elected but illiberal governments are in power in its member states?
There are two perspectives on this. Some say we have a “NATO 3.0” that is gaining strength through stronger European contributions. Others say that this NATO 3.0 is de facto a withdrawal by the USA that the Europeans cannot adequately compensate for - and that thus weakens the credibility of the alliance. I lean towards the second view.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with soldiers: Europe should play an even greater role in the military alliance. Photo: Getty Images
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GermanyAfDEuropeNATOBundeswehrRussia
Marine Le Pen, who could become president of France next year, no longer wants to spend money on Ukraine. How do you assess a scenario in which right-wing populists rule in Berlin and Paris?
Whether NATO can then function also depends on who sits in the White House. American flirting with right-wing populist parties in Germany is a failed strategy. These parties were traditionally anti-American and anti-NATO; Flirting with Trump stopped very quickly after the Iran war. The greater risk is that right-wing populist parties will continue to paralyze or disintegrate NATO - not that a large MAGA alliance will emerge.
Let's look at 2030: Will Germany then be a leading European power, an overwhelmed nation or a nationalist military power?
The situation remains difficult in the short and medium term. In 2030, Germany could be under severe pressure – in the midst of a process of internal reforms and greater foreign policy responsibility. Russia, China and the USA will continue to exert pressure. I don't think the AfD will come to power at the federal level by then. The perspective of ten years makes me more confident: in this time you can create and build something. The route up to then will be pretty tough.
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