A preliminary expert report was prepared regarding the accident in which two Turkish flagged commercial ships collided off the coast of Silivri.
The investigation initiated by the Silivri Chief Public Prosecutor's Office after the ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu sank as a result of the collision of the Turkish-flagged commercial ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" and the Turkish-flagged commercial ship named "Alsu", loaded with rolled sheet metal and rebar, which was sailing from Kocaeli to Aliağa, approximately 18 nautical miles south of Silivri, and the 10-person crew on the ship could not be reached.
LOCATION HAS BEEN DETECTED
The Ministry of National Defense (MSB) reported that the location of the ship that sank in the accident off the coast of Silivri has been determined.
In the statement made by the Ministry of National Defense, it was stated that the search efforts for the ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu and its crew, which sank as a result of the collision of two commercial ships off the coast of Silivri on September 2, 2026, continue.
In the statement, "The TCG Akın rescue and backup ship of our Naval Forces, which has been working in the accident area since the first day, located the sinking ship. Our Naval Forces elements continue their work in a coordinated manner." expressions were used.
The expert committee appointed within the scope of the investigation completed its examination of the technical records obtained from the "Alsu" ship involved in the accident, ECDIS playback data, and the reports provided by the Coast Guard Command and General Directorate of Coastal Safety at the scene of the accident.
In the preliminary detection report prepared in this context, it was stated that as a result of the marine accident that occurred on the Marmara Sea Traffic Separation Strip at around 03.13 on September 2, the ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" was damaged on the pier side and sank rapidly, and there is still no news from its crew.
In the report, which includes limited ECDIS playback data of the ship "Alsu", log records at the time of the incident, statements of the seafarers and a preliminary examination within the framework of the ship's Bridge Management Manual (BMM-Safe Navigation Manual) rules, it is stated that "The accident was caused by both the bridge navigation safety organization violations detected on M/T Alsu (Watch Condition B violation, leaving a single and inexperienced officer, lack of a lookout) and the failure of the AIS device of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship." "It has been determined that it has occurred with a severe bilateral loss of situational awareness as a result of it not working adequately as a result of being turned off/malfunctioning or external intervention and performing dangerous starboard turning maneuvers contrary to the currently available radio agreement." statements were included.
In the report, it was noted that immediately after the accident, the ship "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" sank rapidly due to tearing on the port side, according to the available data, and that the ship named "Alsu" did not suffer any major damage that would prevent navigation or cause water intake, except for light scrapes on the starboard side.
It was stated that after the conflict, a large-scale search and rescue operation was carried out at sea by the crew of the "Alsu" ship, the General Directorate of Coastal Safety (including the Nene Hatun ship) and the Coast Guard Command elements, and during the rescue efforts, the life rafts and free fall lifeboat belonging to the "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" ship were found floating and empty in the sea.
In the report, according to the log records of the ship named "Alsu" dated September 2 and the statements of Captain Ahmet Erarslan, it was stated that the weather condition in the region at the time of the accident was recorded as "bc" (broken clouds - cloudy sky), the wind direction was north and 4 beaufort (Bft) force, the sea state was 3 beaufort and slightly turbulent.
In the expert report, "Visibility is clear and approximately 6 nautical miles. There is no fog, haze, showers or heavy currents restricting maneuver in the region. Therefore, the accident took place at a time when visibility and sea conditions were completely suitable for safe navigation. No external (natural) factor that caused the accident could be detected." evaluation was included.
"CAPTAIN (7-10 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT) WAS ABLE TO COME ONTO THE BRIDGE"
In the report, which stated that the analysis of the bridge staff of the ship named "Alsu" and the personnel situation at the time of the incident revealed findings in terms of judicial malpractice, these findings were conveyed as follows:
"The inexperience of the officer of the watch: The only person on duty on the bridge at the time of the collision was 2nd Officer (3rd Captain) Murat Evciman. From Evciman's official statement, it has been determined that he joined the ship just one day before the accident (31 August) and that his shift at the time of the accident (00.00-04.00) was his first navigational shift on this ship. An officer who was not yet familiar with the ship, its maneuverability, personnel and bridge devices was in heavy traffic traffic." Leaving it alone is a weakness.
No lookout or helmsman: There was no lookout, trainee or helmsman (Watch A.B) on the bridge at around 03.13 when the accident occurred, except Murat Evciman. The officer is completely alone. Watchman trainee Yunus Türker and other personnel are resting in the cabin and on deck. This situation reduced situational awareness on the bridge.
Captain leaving the bridge: Captain Ahmet Erarslan was not on the bridge at the time of the accident and was sleeping in his cabin. He was awakened by the shock of the conflict and was able to get onto the bridge only at around 03.20 (7-10 minutes after the accident). "Although the captain claimed in his statement that he had the authority not to have a lookout in the open sea, this situation is completely against the ship's SMS rules."
IT HAS BEEN EMPHASIS THAT THE SHIP NAMED "ALSU" HAS OPERATIONAL AND SYSTEM DEFECTS
In the report, it was stated that the official Safe Navigation Manual of the ship named "Alsu" was examined and the bridge shift standards approved by the ship's own company were compared with the actual situation at the time of the accident, and it was emphasized that this comparison unquestionably revealed the operational and systemic defect on the side of "Alsu".
In the technical analysis of the ECDIS playback data of the ship named "Alsu", the chronological stages of the development of the conflict were explained as follows in the report:
"Maneuver phases:
1. Detection and invisibility (03.06): At a distance of 1.8 miles, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship appears on Alsu's ECDIS screen as a target moving at a speed of 7.2 knots on the 082° route, only as a radar echo (Missing Echo). The fact that AIS does not send data has made identification and early migration planning impossible.
2. Radio agreement and route change (03.08-03.09): Alsu's 2nd Officer Murat Evciman stated that he established radio communication with the opposing ship via VHF 16, and the other party said 'Escape to the pier.' He declares that upon his request, Alsu started to change its course towards the pier (294.5° at 03.09).
3. Critical maneuver violation (03.10): While Alsu had set its course to 283.9°, with approximately 0.5 miles remaining, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship momentarily disappeared from the ECDIS screen and came back, and contrary to the radio agreement, it suddenly started to turn to its starboard (own right).
4. According to the currently available data, final approach and conflict (03.12-03.13): Tuğberk İmamoğlu changed his course to 133° at a distance of 0.25 miles and reduced his speed to 5.8 knots. ALSU is moving at a speed of 7.8 knots."
THE REASON FOR THE FAST SINKING OF THE SHIP NAMED "TUĞBERK İMAMOĞLU" COULD NOT BE DETECTED
In the report, "It is evaluated that Tuğberk İmamoğlu cut Alsu's bow line vertically and hit his own left (port) bow and Alsu's right (starboard) bow. Examination and evaluation of why the ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu sank so quickly after the conflict as a result of the drift will be possible with the information and documents to be added to the file in the future. Whether there was a cargo shift on the ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu or not "It is also necessary to examine whether there is a lashing vulnerability." statements were included.
In the expert report, the operational processes before, during and after the accident were evaluated within the scope of the Regulation for Preventing Collision at Sea (COLREG) and the Safety Management System (SMS) in the light of forensic and technical evidence, and the fault qualities of the parties were explained with justification according to the available data.
Accordingly, in the report stating that the ship named "Alsu" violated the lookout rules, the following was noted:
"While the ship named Alsu was cutting the separation line, which is one of the busiest and most risky traffic areas, it did not have a helmsman or a lookout on the bridge, other than a single officer. The rule of 'complete lookout', which must be done by visual and radar, was clearly violated. This situation prevented the opposing ship's starboard turn maneuver, which was contrary to the radio agreement, to be noticed in time and early and to react (to make a conflict-preventing maneuver)."
In the report, in terms of violation of SMS regulations, "While the ship was ordered to sail at 'Watch Condition B' level in the official BMM guide, the absence of the captain on the bridge and not assigning watchman personnel is an operational management weakness. Captain Ahmet Erarslan did not fulfill his inspection obligation by leaving the navigation safety to the inexperienced officer." was evaluated.
In terms of Collision Avoidance Maneuver rule violation, the report stated the following:
"Watch officer Murat Evciman noticed at a very close distance of 0.5 miles that the opposing ship was approaching them and did not comply with the radio agreement and turned to starboard. At this stage, instead of making an early engine stop or full astern (reverse) maneuver to prevent the conflict, he just continued to change course to port. It is considered that not taking early speed reduction or stopping the machines may have increased the physical severity of the conflict."
"TUĞBERK İMAMOĞLU CREATED A SERIOUS NAILING HAZARD BY SAILING IN 'GHOST SHIP' MODE"
The report also included defects and violations regarding the ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu".
Tuğberk İmamoğlu stated in the report that the ship created a serious navigational hazard for other ships and VTS stations in the region by sailing in "ghost ship" mode because its AIS device was off, malfunctioning, or not working adequately as a result of external intervention. It was noted that the ship named "Alsu" could detect this target as a radar echo only 1.8 miles away. It was emphasized that this situation directly hinders early warning and safe passage planning.
In the report, although it was stated in the radio conversations that it was understood that the opposite ship would avoid port, it was stated that the operational defect that physically started the accident was that it suddenly steered hard to starboard and cut the bow line of the ship named "Alsu" with 0.5 miles remaining.
ACCIDENT REASON
In the evaluation section of the expert report, the cause of the accident was explained as follows:
"The main root cause of the conflict and the subsequent sinking and crew loss disaster is 'Double-sided bridge indiscipline, complete abandonment of watchkeeping standards and loss of situational awareness'. The fact that the ship named 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' sailed by turning off the AIS device and turned to starboard in the last 0.5 miles, contrary to the radio agreement, is the active trigger factor that physically started the conflict. However, this trigger factor is the main reason behind it ending in a disaster." The root cause is the bridge vulnerability on the ship named Alsu. If Alsu had kept an experienced captain and an additional watchman on the bridge by complying with the 'Watch Condition B' rule in its own safety manual (BMM), 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu's uncontrolled turn to starboard maneuver could have been detected at a distance of 1.5-1.8 miles instead of 0.5 miles. In accordance with COLREG Rule 8, the conflict would have been stopped immediately by stopping the machines or giving an emergency astern. "The sinking of Tuğberk İmamoğlu could have been prevented or the impact severity could have been prevented by minimizing it. The alone, inexperienced officer on the bridge could not analyze this situation in time and the door to the tragedy of loss of life was opened."
In the report, it is stated that there is no video record of the ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" in the VTS images submitted to the file by the Ship Traffic Services of the General Directorate of Coastal Safety, and added: "However, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship was seen on the ECDIS screen of the Alsu ship." The statement was included.
In the expert report, VHF radio voice recordings, extended VTS radar and screen recordings, why the ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" sank so quickly after the accident, and whether there was a cargo shift or lashing vulnerability, were included in the expert report, in order to reveal the material truth beyond any doubt, since the crew of the ship named "Tuğberk İmamoğlu" was lost at sea and the case could be of "causing death by negligence". It was emphasized that it is a technical necessity to collect the ship's loading plan (stowage plan), cargo mooring certificates, loading port, loading moment camera records and stability calculations and the outdoor camera records of the ship named "Alsu" by writing a memorandum in order to determine the load.
SEARCH WORKS CONTINUE
Search and rescue efforts continue on the 3rd day after the accident of 2 ships named Alsu and Tuğberk İmamoğlu off the coast of Silivri. The anxious wait of the relatives of the missing continues at the crisis desk set up on the beach.
In the accident, which occurred 18 miles off the coast of Silivri, the Turkish flagged 90-meter-long commercial ship named Alsu, going from Kocaeli to Aliağa, collided with the commercial ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu, going from İskenderun Port to Karadeniz Ereğli. While the ship named Tuğberk İmamoğlu sank within 8 minutes in the accident, efforts to search for the 10-person crew on board continue on the 3rd day.
It was learned that the investigations continue on the ship named Alsu, which was pulled approximately 2 kilometers offshore from Silivri and subjected to expert examination.
