◎ Huang Yuxuan
On September 22, 2026, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released the report "China's Gray Zone Threats to Trans-Pacific Undersea Cables" written by the China Strategic Risks Institute. It pointed out that China has developed a series of dual-use technologies based on its "military-civilian fusion" strategy and gradually improved its detection, interference, and control capabilities for submarine cables.
Submarine cables are fragile and have limited backup and repair capabilities. The picture shows a schematic diagram of submarine cable construction. (File photo) This report also pointed out that the trans-Pacific submarine cable connecting the United States, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam is fragile and has limited backup and repair capabilities. It is recommended to make use of the "Trans-Pacific Submarine Cable Gray Zone Vulnerability Index" to strengthen the "communication business information security management and communication network information security joint defense" of the Digital Development Department.
However, China-US submarine cable security management does not stop at this report. FCC 26-42, formulated by the Federal Communications Commission of the United States and effective on September 25 this year, shows that regulatory thinking is no longer limited to whether submarine cables have been damaged, and further requires that submarine cable line terminal equipment (Submarine Line Terminal Equipment) and corresponding procedures are in line with the national security interests of the United States.
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China has announced the "15th Five-Year Plan" for the development of the information and communications industry. On the one hand, it will improve the resilience of international communications networks and expand the layout of submarine cables in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. On the other hand, it will strengthen regular patrol law enforcement. It is worth investigating whether the United States can extend its regulatory system to the underwater technology supply chain. Instead, China needs to track the legislative process of the "Regulations on the Laying, Protection and Management of Submarine Cable Pipelines" and whether submarine cable protection is further connected with foreign-related law enforcement and overseas security systems. To sum up, the competition for submarine cables between China and the United States has gradually shifted from a single risk of "cable breakage or not" to a comprehensive competition of "who can control the submarine cables".
The competition for submarine cables between China and the United States has turned to a comprehensive competition of "who can control the submarine cables". The picture shows the footage of my country's Coast Guard escorting the Hongtai freighter suspected of having towed the third Taiwan-Penghuan submarine cable off the coast of Tainan back to Anping Port for investigation. (File photo, provided by the Coast Guard) (The author is a doctoral student at the Institute of International Affairs and Strategy, Tamkang University)
