Nearly 20,000 people this year risked the perilous sea journey from Libya to the Greek island of Crete. Thus, this route, extending from the eastern coast of Libya to Greece, has become one of the most prominent irregular migration routes to Europe, according to the Greek newspaper Kathimerini.
Case in point: On October 20 alone, Greek authorities recorded the arrival of 710 people on 14 boats. The next day hundreds more arrived. Many boats depart from the area around Tobruk. According to Kathimerini newspaper, migrants sometimes pay up to 4,000 US dollars to smuggler networks for the journey, which takes about a day and a half.
The increasing importance of this route is also linked to tightening security measures along other migration routes. After the armed forces in eastern Libya launched an intense campaign in 2023 against the activities of smugglers heading to Italy, the networks resumed their activities at the end of the year using different methods: they used smaller boats and diverted many trips to the island of Crete.
According to an analysis conducted by the Swiss-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, smuggling gangs that previously traded in goods, vehicles and drugs have also entered the field of human smuggling. It is noteworthy that boats are sometimes made locally in the vicinity of Tobruk, while migrants wait in homes near the coast until their journey begins, according to experts.
Business in an informal power system
Human smuggling in Libya is closely linked to what is known as the “conflict economy”: by controlling informal markets and transport routes, armed actors can gain economic resources and political influence. At the same time, local power holders can also use anti-smuggling measures to obtain financial or political support. A study issued by the British research center Chatham House addresses these mechanisms, focusing on the cities of Kufra, Sabha, and Al-Zawiya as transit points. As for the path extending from Tobruk to the island of Crete, the existence of such a connection has not yet been concretely proven.
Hajar Ali, a political science expert at the German Institute for Global and Regional Studies (GIGA), said in an interview with DW: "The situation is still the same. An entire industry has formed around smuggling methods, whether it is weapons, goods, people, or drugs." Where contacts, transportation and protection structures are already in place, illegal activity related to migrants can become integrated into existing networks.
In the politically divided east of the country, power is mainly concentrated in the hands of General Khalifa Haftar and the military and political structures associated with him. His sons, especially Saddam Haftar, also hold important positions. It remains unclear whether the smugglers on the coast are linked to the family networks.
According to expert Hajar Ali, simply giving the impression of control over informal markets can provide political influence: “The more apparent control over this market, the greater the influence,” Ali adds. Those who can influence or prevent departures can thus demonstrate their importance to other actors.
Highly publicized operations against smugglers may also contribute to enhancing political legitimacy: “One shows oneself as being able to bring order and stop migration,” says Ali, clearly referring to political decision-makers in eastern Libya. But she confirms that there is no concrete evidence of links between the Haftar family and smuggler networks.
Geopolitical interests
The migration route between eastern Libya and Crete is gaining increasing importance, especially in light of the competition in the eastern Mediterranean. On October 20, the parliament in Tobruk in eastern Libya approved a maritime rights agreement with Türkiye that Ankara had originally concluded in 2019 only with the rival government in Tripoli. This decision is evidence of the rapprochement between Türkiye and Haftar's camp, whose camp Ankara had fought militarily for a long period during the Libyan civil war. Both parties seek to achieve economic and strategic interests, especially with regard to potential energy projects. Greece rejects this agreement because it sees it as violating its maritime and economic rights around islands such as Crete and Rhodes.
No direct link between the agreement and the rise in arrivals has been proven. But expert Hajar Ali believes that it is theoretically possible for immigration to be used as a means of pressure in geopolitical conflicts. In this regard, it stresses that no potential control over the departures has been demonstrated by Haftar’s leadership or those around it.
Europe's dilemma
In order to prevent the departure of migrant groups across the Mediterranean, the European Union cooperates with the Libyan authorities and security agencies, although their links to armed groups and their political legitimacy are disputed. Geographer Andreas Dittmann of the University of Giessen points out the paradox inherent in this policy: cooperation may serve the goal of controlling migration but at the same time it may enhance the power of local actors.
Dittmann told DW: "If officials in eastern Libya are actually able to influence the size and timing of such movements, they will be able to prove their strategic importance to European governments."
A report issued by the International Organization for Migration based on data from May and June 2026 shows the vulnerability of the situation for many migrants. According to this report, about 950,000 registered migrants and refugees were living in Libya. Many have only limited access to medical care, and the lack of residence and work permits increases their dependence on informal structures and increases their risk of exploitation.
Prepared in Arabic by: M.A.M
