The escalation of internal and regional crises threatens the stability of Abiy Ahmed’s government in Ethiopia

The turmoil facing the government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is no longer confined to the borders of regions in conflict with the center. With the expansion of armed conflicts in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, and the formation of a new alliance that includes seven armed groups from different regions and nationalities, Ethiopia’s internal crises have become complicated and intertwined with border disputes with neighbors, which threatens to disrupt the balances of the Horn of Africa region.

According to Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation and a research professor at Tufts University, politics and security in Ethiopia have become “extremely intertwined” with the situations of Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan.

De Waal told Asharq Al-Awsat that the region is witnessing “a mosaic of conflicts, in which each level of conflict is linked to the higher level, so that the roots of the conflicts remain local, while external factors help prolong them and make their settlement more difficult.”

This photo comes in the wake of seven Ethiopian armed groups recently announcing the formation of the “Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces for Survival Alliance,” with the aim of changing the current government. The coalition included former opponents who fought on both sides of the Tigray war between 2020 and 2022.

An alliance does not necessarily mean a cohesive military front; There are still deep differences between its components. Magnus Taylor, deputy director of the Horn of Africa Project at the International Crisis Group, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the ability of groups to work together may be hampered by geographical distances and political differences.”

But the importance of the alliance lies in the fact that it reflects a broader shift in the conflict. Here, Hajar Ali, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Regional Studies (GIGA), told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the crisis that the Ethiopian state is suffering from in managing its federal system allows separate regional conflicts to erupt simultaneously,” warning also that the parties to these conflicts may compete with each other for political resources and representation.

In the opinion of Ibrahim Idris, a researcher in African and international affairs, the deterioration of the relationship between the center and Tigray after the faltering implementation of the Pretoria Agreement threatens “the integrity of the federal structural system” itself.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat, “The dilemma does not stop at Tigray, because the three most influential nationalities in the course of the Ethiopian state, namely the Amhara, the Tigray, and the Oromo, each of them has, to different degrees, a conflict or disagreement with the center.”

Last June's elections reveal one of the most prominent paradoxes of the Ethiopian scene. The “Prosperity Party” led by Abiy Ahmed won 438 seats, which guaranteed it a wide parliamentary majority, but the elections did not take place in all districts. Among them are Tigray, Amhara and Oromia.

Hajar Ali said, “Although the party appears to enjoy a strong parliamentary majority, this does not mean that it is actually capable of addressing the ethnic or regional issues that cause and exacerbate instability,” and Ali does not see a clear separation between “local grievances” and the broader conflict over the future of the state.

The Tigray file remains the most susceptible to transforming sporadic crises into a broader crisis. The Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022, ended a two-year war between the federal government and Tigray forces.

But the crisis escalated during the current year, with the Tigray People's Liberation Front re-establishing its political control over the region in May, accusing the federal government of not implementing the agreement. Here, Taylor explained that the Pretoria Agreement “is still in place officially, but it is no longer effective on the ground.”

However, Taylor does not consider that the political door has been completely closed, indicating that there is room for negotiation, through the efforts of the African Union.

In Amhara, the government faces a different dilemma. Fano forces fought alongside the federal army during the Tigray War, before turning into an opponent of the government in 2023. Idris said, “The most important development is the movement’s transition from political disagreement to adopting weapons as a tool for regime change.”

In Oromia, the region to which Abiy Ahmed himself belongs, and whose popular protests played a pivotal role in the political changes that brought him to the presidency of the government, the “Oromo Liberation Army” continued its rebellion against the state, and previous rounds of negotiations did not lead to a comprehensive settlement.

In Hajar Ali’s opinion, “The Oromia conflict demonstrates that the crisis cannot be reduced to a reaction to the policies of recent years alone. The conflict there has been going on for decades, and a large part of it relates to the relationship between the center and regional powers.”

Idris pointed to “divisions within the Oromo political movement itself, with forces that were part of the environment that supported Abiy’s rise later distancing themselves from the government.”

Thus, the government is facing, at the same time, an Amharic rebellion, an ongoing conflict in Oromia, and a gradual collapse of its understanding with Tigray. But what gives these conflicts a more dangerous regional dimension is its relationship with the neighbourhood. Eritrea, whose relationship with Abiy Ahmed moved from historical reconciliation in 2018 to an alliance with him during the Tigray war, is once again in the position of an opponent.

Last February, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gideon Timotheus accused Eritrea of ​​supporting armed groups inside Ethiopia. Taylor said that “Eritrea has a history of supporting Ethiopian opposition groups,” but pointed out that “its current cooperation with the Tigray forces is focused on allowing them to move through Eritrean territory and perhaps providing some technical military assistance.”

Taylor linked this rapprochement to Asmara's fears of Ethiopia's ambitions to obtain a port on the Red Sea, reserving the description of the "Tigray People's Liberation Front as an agent of Eritrea," while Idris argued that the repercussions of the port crisis pushed Eritrea into a "defensive position."

Alex de Waal placed this scene in a broader historical context, pointing out that the Horn of Africa had known, since the 1970s and 1980s, a pattern of wars in which each country supported rebels fighting the government of the other country, and some of this entanglement continued after the Cold War, even if its causes and alliances changed.

De Waal said that the roots of crises remain “local,” but external entanglements “keep conflicts going and make them intractable and difficult to resolve.”

Sudan stands out as one of the most sensitive links in this entanglement, in addition to the crisis with Somalia after the agreement that Addis Ababa signed with “Somaliland” in early 2024 to obtain a sea port. Hajar Ali believes that “focusing on armed conflicts alone may obscure other pressures that could increase the ability of these conflicts to weaken the state,” pointing to the harsh climate conditions and their repercussions on food security, infrastructure, and displacement. She said that “the ongoing wars have reduced the government’s ability to deal with such crises.”

In the face of these pressures, the government is betting on political institutions and national dialogue in parallel with security operations. De Waal believes that the problem is deeper than just the absence of a negotiating table. De Waal said: “We are facing an environment in which all pressures are pushing towards the continuation of the war.”

Even when negotiations begin, he estimates, they often focus on a ceasefire, forming a coalition, or concluding a political deal, rather than addressing the roots of the conflict and building a “lasting settlement.”

Despite the multiple pressures, the Ethiopian government still maintains state apparatuses, a large military force, and a broad parliamentary majority, and its opponents do not yet form a homogeneous political or military bloc. But this does not cancel out a fundamental shift in the nature of the crisis. In De Waal's opinion, reversing this path requires “a much greater degree of cooperation between African countries, as well as with countries in the Arab world and the international community.” He concluded that “this cooperation does not exist.”