Amman, Jordan (CNN) - Security and political calculations intertwine along the northern front of Jordan, at a time when regional powers seek to draw up the rules of engagement in southern Syria. The repercussions of the closed Amman meeting, which was held on August 23, emerged in the interactions of several local Jordanian and Syrian circles.
The security meeting that brought together Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani and Israeli Mossad head Roman Goffman, along with two accompanying delegations, and which took place under Jordanian sponsorship and American mediation, was not, according to observers, just a passing diplomatic movement, but rather came in an attempt to contain any field escalation in southern Syria and cordon off any security repercussions that would affect Jordan as well.
In this context, a position paper issued by the Institute of Politics and Society (an independent Jordanian studies and research center) on September 4, 2026 highlights the importance of this diplomatic move and what was dictated by field necessity, following the direct Israeli targeting of Abu Al-Duhur Airport in northwestern Syria.
According to the paper, which constituted a summary of the analyzes of political and security experts from Jordan, with the participation of the Damascus-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies (a research institution for developing public policies), the Amman meeting came as a Syrian-American attempt to reactivate the negotiating path and avoid the complete collapse of the previous understandings that were announced within the “Paris Cell” at the beginning of the year, without finding their way to practical implementation due to Israeli rejection.
Analytical trends consider that the real success of the Amman meeting lies in its ability to restrict Israeli military action and restore stability under the umbrella of Syrian sovereignty, warning of Tel Aviv’s efforts to turn the south into a “soft security flank” that weakens Damascus’s ability to control its borders and threatens Jordanian national security.
The paper also revealed that the proposed proposal to establish an operations room in Amman under American supervision mainly aims to address urgent field coordination and contain the direct Israeli-Turkish tension within the Syrian geography.
This fear of imposing a “new reality” on the northern borders of the Kingdom finds an echo in the reading of Jordanian analysts. Researcher and professor of political sociology, Dr. Badr Al-Mady, believes that the security of the Jordanian borders is linked to the need for Amman to be “an integral part of any future security arrangements and understandings,” given the immediate vital depth of the Kingdom that southern Syria represents.
Al-Mady warns of the strategic danger of the Israeli moves, saying: “Israel’s control or expansion of its influence in the south means practically reconnecting the Suwayda Governorate to the north of occupied Palestine,” explaining that this plan aims to create a new geo-tourism and security reality extending along the Jordanian border.
Al-Mady indicated, in an interview with CNN Arabic, that this path will inevitably lead to “the geographic and security encirclement of Jordan from its western and northern borders,” which, according to his assessment, constitutes an attempt to weaken Jordan and its security and political position in the Syrian and Palestinian files.
Over the past two years, Jordan has not backed down from continuing to implement its deterrence strategy on the northern border, related to confronting weapons and drug smuggling operations, and the Jordanian Air Force carried out strikes inside Syrian territory that, according to previous official statements, targeted sites linked to smuggling networks, in coordination with the Syrian side.
Jordan also places, according to political and security interpretations, Israeli behavior in southern Syria at a high level of threat, especially in light of fears of the right-wing Israeli government’s tendencies to establish a pro-Israel entity in southern Syria.
Al-Mady, for his part, believes that the Jordanian comment on hosting the meeting at the time gave the impression that it cooperated with the Americans towards reducing the escalation, but he confirms that Jordan is working to try to control Israeli behavior, and is sending clear messages to the Americans and Israelis that it “will not allow Israel to occupy southern Syria.”
Al-Madhi also links this to the West Bank, considering that the increasing frequency of threats to displace Palestinians has turned it into a new source of threat to Jordanian national security, which makes Jordan directly concerned with the arrangements related to southern Syria.
He says that Jordanian involvement in this path is “justified and understandable,” noting that Jordan may go further if Israel continues to turn the Suwayda file into a security file that threatens Jordanian national security by linking it to Israel.
On the other hand, Al-Mady believes that the sources of direct threats coming from As-Suwayda have decreased significantly, estimating their decrease by about 90%, especially with the decline in smuggling operations into Jordan. But he puts at the forefront of his concerns the suggestions that the Druze are linked to Israel.
In this context, he says: “My problem today is with what is on the mind of the Druze and the security grip exercised by Hikmat Al-Hijri, so that Jordan becomes a target and target for the Druze through their communication with the Israelis,” considering that this may be used by Israel in confronting Jordan.
There are also fears that large numbers of residents of Daraa and Quneitra will be displaced back to Jordan, and that local forces will be able to control southern Syria.
The past indicates the continuation of security channels between Jordan, Israel and the countries of the region, despite the decline in Jordanian political communication with Israel in recent years, considering that the nature of the Israeli representation in the Amman meeting, which was security and not political, reflects the nature of the file being discussed.
Regarding the American role, Al-Mady believes that betting on Washington alone is “not a rational option,” despite the importance of continuing communication with the United States and Europe, considering that changing the stereotyped image of Israel among sectors of public opinion and Western institutions provides an area upon which Jordan can build politically, security-wise, and culturally.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, about 220,000 Syrians have returned from Jordan to Syria as of July 31, 2026, while the UNHCR continues to support voluntary returns with cash and logistical assistance, while official figures indicate 671,000 refugees registered with the United Nations hosted by the Kingdom out of 1.3 million.
In recent years, Jordan has taken open political and security measures regarding the Syrian file, in parallel with the return of channels of cooperation with Damascus, including discussing joint economic and vital files in water, energy and trade. On the other hand, attempts to smuggle drugs and weapons across the northern border remained a security challenge for the Kingdom.
For his part, security and strategic expert Omar Al-Raddad believes that the Jordanian approach towards Syria is based in principle on supporting the Syrian state and its territorial integrity, and rejecting any secessionist movements or demands for autonomy on a sectarian or religious basis in southern Syria, while emphasizing the rights of Syrian citizens, without this meaning interference in Syrian affairs.
Al-Raddad says that Jordan "is not concerned with the composition, ideology, and reference of the Syrian regime, and deals with it with very high pragmatism," but it wants a political guarantee that the Syrian state will be able to extend its control over its entire territory, and that it will deal with Jordan with respect and open horizons for development and cooperation.
Al-Raddad links security and the economy, considering that "dictatorship or internal chaos in any region of Syria means the inability of the central state to control the situation," which may allow the emergence of groups working to export terrorism or weapons.
In this context, Al-Raddad believes, in his interview with CNN Arabic, that Jordan supports strengthening the centralization of the Syrian state and ending the phenomenon of “parallel armies,” stressing that the existence of such forces is “unacceptable in Jordan.”
According to Al-Raddad, Jordan attaches special importance to southern Syria, extending from Daraa and Damascus to Al-Tanf in the east, and Quneitra and the Golan border in the west, as “an integral part of Jordanian national security.”
He pointed out that the stability of this region reflects on Jordan's security, and at the same time opens the way for development projects and trade and economic exchange.
But the scene in the south, according to Al-Raddad, is “complex and complicated due to the entry of the Israeli factor,” in light of fears that the changing balance of influence in Syria will lead to the replacement of previous Iranian influence with Turkish influence.
On the other hand, Al-Raddad points to the transformations that have occurred in the position of the new Syrian leadership, saying that “it is not possible to continue talking about Ahmed Al-Sharaa as Al-Julani,” in light of what he describes as the new leadership’s openness to the international community, including the United States, and the developments that have occurred in Syria’s international situation.
Regarding the Israeli escalation, Al-Raddad says that Syria is being subjected to successive strikes and breaches of the armistice line, but it has not initiated an actual military response, considering that the Syrian leadership realizes that “the time is not on its side to engage in a battle with Israel,” and is currently seeking to return to the previous armistice arrangements.
He believes that the developments in the course of the Syrian-Israeli security arrangements may expand within this framework, and he said: “I do not think it will go far,” suggesting that the goal is to return to the armistice line of 1974, while talk about a peace treaty and full normalization remains “early,” due to its connection to the future of the Golan.
Al-Raddad links the future of Syrian and regional normalization to a large extent to the Saudi position, saying that this “will be primarily linked, in addition to the internal situation, to the future of Saudi normalization specifically with Israel,” in light of Riyadh’s continued requirement for progress in the Palestinian issue and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
He adds that the region is still “in a gray area with no certainty at the moment,” awaiting the outcome of the Israeli and Palestinian situations, in addition to developments in the Iranian regime and its arms in the region.
Al-Raddad stressed that Jordan is interested in being present in any arrangements related to Syria and Israel, especially southern Syria, because “the importance of geography is not only linked to proximity of place, but rather to Jordanian national security.”
He points out that the meeting discussed the formation of an operations room for security coordination, and discussed buffer zones and security zones, considering that this requires “Jordan to have great knowledge” in light of what he sees as the Kingdom’s growing concerns about the Israeli discourse regarding “Greater Israel” and the position of the Israeli right on Jordan.
Al-Raddad stresses that the security dimension in southern Syria differs from the economic and service files, saying: “The issue in southern Syria is a security file, and it is managed by Jordan and the security services,” in light of the presence of potential sources of threat inside Syria, although their size, according to his estimation, is less than it was previously.
He concludes that the Jordanian approach is based on not replacing one threat with another, saying: “Just as Israel says that it does not want a regime in Syria loyal to Iran to be replaced by a regime loyal to Turkey, we do not want the Iranian threat to be replaced by an Israeli threat in the region as well. This is the approach.”
