The Yemeni Houthi Ansar Allah movement appeared more powerful and influential in the wake of its recent seizure of strategic areas near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and its success in launching attacks targeting sites deep within Saudi Arabia, one of which led to the disruption of the east-west line for exporting Saudi oil, on which the Kingdom relied heavily in the wake of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These events reflect the significant development witnessed by the Houthis' military capabilities in recent years.
These gains come amid increasing evidence indicating the expansion of the Houthi presence and relations across the Red Sea. A report issued late last month by the American non-profit research organization The Century Foundation, based in New York City, documented growing relations between the Ansar Allah Houthi group and armed groups in the Horn of Africa region. A UN report included evidence of transfers of weapons, people, and training between the Houthis and one of those groups, namely the Somali Islamic Al-Shabaab movement, which is loyal to Al-Qaeda.
What is the depth of the ties that the Houthis have established in the Horn of Africa region? Are we witnessing the formation of a regional network, as the Century Foundation report indicates? Will the development of relations between armed groups on both sides of the Red Sea lead to the merging of armed conflicts?
Relations with “youth”: from utilitarian to strategic
Nadwa Al-Dosari, a fellow at the Center for Armed Groups and one of the authors of the Century Foundation report, told BBC Arabic that many of the Houthis’ relationships in the Horn of Africa were initially limited to exchanging benefits and making deals. “The Houthis have always relied on smugglers and crime networks in the Horn of Africa to transport weapons, people and goods, but we found that these relationships have developed significantly, especially in the wake of the events of October 7,” she said.
The clearest evidence of the expansion of Houthi relations in that region comes from Somalia, where the relationship between Ansar Allah and the “Al-Shabaab Mujahideen Movement” has developed significantly over the past years, according to a report by the Century Foundation and a report by a United Nations committee of experts.
The United Nations report, published late last year, indicates that cooperation between the two sides has deepened significantly, to include weapons smuggling and technical training - including in the field of operational tactics, and the exchange of military expertise and logistical support, and that this may pose a threat, not only to the security and stability of Yemen, but to the entire region. The report described the goal of this cooperation with the Al-Shabaab movement as not just a mutually beneficial relationship, but also within the framework of a Houthi strategy aimed at increasing its influence in the region.
The UN report indicates that the Somali authorities confiscated weapons and explosives smuggled from Yemen, and that a Somali citizen affiliated with Al-Shabaab confessed to coordinating with the Houthis and helping to facilitate the travel of about 400 Somalis to receive military and ideological training in areas controlled by the Houthis in Yemen. The report adds that the Committee of Experts received information from responsible sources indicating that Al-Shabaab maintains an operational presence in Hadramaut Governorate, and that the Somali cells present there are primarily tasked with purchasing weapons from Houthi elements and smuggling them into Somalia.
The Century Foundation report, entitled: “From a subsidiary party to a pivotal center: The Houthis in Africa,” talks about Houthi efforts to train Somali recruits in Yemen, and says that Houthi engineers traveled to areas under the control of the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia. He also points out the existence of training in areas including manufacturing improvised explosive devices, adapting drones to meet specific requirements, and weapons maintenance.
Al-Dosari says that the Houthis “are gaining a broader foothold in the Horn of Africa, including networks, relationships, and field influence, while Al-Shabaab benefits from weapons, technology, and military expertise that the Houthis have accumulated during more than a decade of war in Yemen.”
In this context, the analyst and military expert - close to the Ansar Allah Houthi movement - Abdul Ghani Al-Zubaidi ruled out the establishment of any relations between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia, describing it as “with the same takfiri and extremist orientation.” He told the BBC: "According to the data, it is impossible for there to be a relationship between Ansar Allah and the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia, and it is not possible for Sanaa to stay with these movements, regardless of what the interests are." He wondered how, under the circumstances of the current war, Sanaa could continue to export weapons to Somalia.
Al-Zubaidi also questioned the accuracy of the United Nations reports in this regard, explaining that they are “most often based on Western or American reports, without an independent mechanism to verify the accuracy of the information contained therein.”
Hizam al-Assad, a member of the political bureau of the Ansar Allah movement in Sanaa, supported this, telling the BBC that some UN reports are based on “misleading and hostile Saudi information and sources,” calling on the organization to focus on the suffering of the Yemeni people “as a result of the Saudi siege and aggression,” as he put it.
It should be noted that the Houthis and Al-Shabaab have different goals and operate in different environments. The two parties also differ ideologically, as the Houthis belong to the Zaidi Shiite sect, while members of the Al-Shabaab movement belong to the Sunni sect. Does the relationship between the two sides remain a utilitarian relationship based primarily on interests, or can it develop beyond that?
In statements to BBC News Arabic, Professor Stig Jarl Hansen, professor of political science at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences and author of the book “Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of an Armed Islamic Movement,” says, “Given the ideological differences, including the possibility that such a relationship might alienate recruits into the ranks of Al-Shabaab, I think its nature is utilitarian.”
Hansen adds: “There may be some Al-Shabaab leaders who want to benefit from the Houthis’ proficiency in manufacturing drones. In general, Al-Shabaab has been able to achieve a large financial surplus, which may constitute an attractive factor for the Houthis.”
However, Al-Dosari believes that the relationship between the two parties may create in the future a direct link that may be difficult to reverse between the conflict in Yemen and the conflict in the state of Somalia, which has witnessed an armed conflict for nearly two decades between the government in Mogadishu and the Al-Shabaab movement: “Once you establish personal relationships, training lines, methods for transferring weapons, and channels for transferring technical expertise, all of these things can continue even if the political circumstances that originally brought the two groups closer together change. This is what makes this relationship on the face of disbelief worrying.”
Wider spread across the Red Sea
Somalia is not the only country in the Horn of Africa region that has received the attention of the Houthis. The Century Foundation report mentions Djibouti, Sudan, and Eritrea as other countries witnessing the growth of Houthi activities and networks, or where conditions exist that may provide the group with opportunities to expand its scope of influence in the future.
Geography may help explain the reasons for the Houthis’ interest in diversifying their sources of obtaining the raw materials and components needed to manufacture their weapons, especially in the state of Djibouti, which is located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea directly opposite Yemen, and has one of the most important ports in the region, the port of Djibouti, overlooking the gateway to the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The report indicates that the port has become a center for smuggling operations carried out by the Houthis, and that they exploit the commercial infrastructure and legal transportation networks to obtain the equipment and components they need and then transport them to Yemen.
In this context, Al-Zubaidi, who is close to the Ansar Allah Houthi movement, saw that the port of Djibouti is subject to the UN verification mechanism, wondering how the movement could be accused of smuggling shipments through it, in light of the constant presence of the Americans and Saudis to monitor what is happening in the port.
According to the report, the Houthis began supporting the Sudanese army in its conflict with the Rapid Support Forces in mid-2024, with them reportedly transferring light weapons to it on behalf of Iran. The report, citing several sources, indicates the presence of Houthi elements in the port of Port Sudan, using it as a logistical and financial center, and the movement of weapons and people across the Red Sea in both directions. Although there is a growing body of evidence to support these allegations, the report points out that it is not conclusive.
The Century Foundation report says that the Houthis may rebuild their relations with Eritrea with help from Iran, and may use it as a transit point for weapons destined for Yemen. But the evidence available from open sources has not yet conclusively confirmed the presence of activity at the alleged smuggling sites.
The absence of conclusive evidence should not “cause us to turn a blind eye to what we are seeing in the Horn of Africa,” Al-Dosari says. “There is a lesson we have learned from the conflict in Yemen, which is that the Houthis should not be underestimated for lack of evidence. I remember that a decade ago, there was a lot of debate about the extent of Iranian support for the Houthis, and this was partly due to the absence of strong evidence. By the time the evidence became overwhelming, the Houthis had already established significant military capabilities, and their ties to Iran had become stronger.” It has become more difficult to confront it.”
Regarding relations with Eritrea, Abdul-Ghani Al-Zubaidi says: “I hope that there will be relations and that Eritrea will recognize the authority of Sana’a.” But he does not see that the Eritrean side is essentially seeking to establish relations with the Ansar Allah Houthi movement in Yemen. He refers to Yemeni complaints about the interception of Yemeni fishermen by Eritrean forces in Yemeni territorial waters, as well as fears in Sanaa about the possibility of Eritrea establishing relations with the United States, which may pose a threat to Yemen.
Are we witnessing the formation of a regional network?
The Century Foundation report believes that the Houthis’ expansion into the Horn of Africa along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden mimics the efforts made by Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah group at the beginning of this century to establish networks of armed groups in the Middle East region, which later became what is known as the “axis of resistance,” and that the Houthis are seeking to consolidate their position as a new center for that axis.
But Professor Hansen believes that describing the current relations as representing the emergence of a broader regional network of armed groups is considered "significantly exaggerated," adding that "the Houthis' activities in Africa are still limited, and are much less than Iran's activities."
Iran's role also adds complexity to the picture. There is a close alliance between Tehran and the Houthis, who have benefited from Iranian military support, but have become more sophisticated in building their own weapons systems. Their relationship with Tehran does not mean that it exercises complete control over them. “The Houthis are allied with the Iranians, but they are not a puppet of Tehran,” Hansen says. “Houthi allies can support Iran, as long as that support does not incur a high cost to them.”
Al-Dosari says it will be difficult to determine the extent to which these relationships will develop because they will likely continue to operate in secret, “but what I will be watching is evidence of capabilities that are already transferring: Al-Shabaab or other armed groups using drones or weapons in the Horn of Africa that indicate Houthi or Iranian technologies, or carrying out more complex or coordinated naval or piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean, or a greater Houthi presence in Somalia, or increasingly sophisticated smuggling, training, and logistics operations.” And coordination.”
