While the circles of turmoil within Ethiopia are expanding from “Tigray” to Amhara and Oromia, the repercussions of the crisis seem far beyond the boundaries of the conflict between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and its internal opponents, complicating the ambitions of Abiy Ahmed’s regional government, especially in the files of searching for an outlet on the Red Sea and the “Renaissance Dam.”
According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, the relationship between internal crises and regional ambitions is intersecting. While Abiy Ahmed needs a “national symbol” to strengthen his influence and push the people to rally around his government, the fragility of the internal situation may deepen regional disputes, obstruct their settlement, and limit the regime’s ability to compete for influence in the Horn of Africa.
This intersection was pointed out in a study published by Ethiopian researcher Begachew Metiko Abera, from Bahir Dar University, last August, in which he said that the search for a sea port is a “long-term strategic goal” linked to economic and security needs, but armed conflicts, economic pressures, and the decline of internal political legitimacy played a role in determining the timing of signing the memorandum of understanding with “Somaliland” in 2024.
According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently published, “the relationship between the internal situation and foreign policy operates in a complex manner,” explaining that “the broad parliamentary majority obtained by the (Prosperity) Party reduces the institutional restrictions imposed on Abiy Ahmed’s government, but the Ethiopian moves regarding the sea port and the (Renaissance Dam) prompted the emergence of regional alignments against him.”
Hajar Ali, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Regional Studies (GIGA), confirmed that “the use of external competition to mobilize internal affairs is not new in the policy of the Abiy Ahmed government.” She told Asharq Al-Awsat that “regional competition was a powerful tool for mobilizing support and mobilizing nationalist sentiments, especially in light of societal divisions and separatist tendencies.”
But Hajar stressed at the same time that “this equation becomes more difficult as internal cohesion declines,” explaining that “unifying different groups within Ethiopia in the face of a common external competitor is something that will only succeed if the federal government is stable.”
She said, “The decline in stability could open the way for a geopolitical realignment that could change the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.”
The memorandum of understanding that Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January 2024 sparked a political crisis. Shafie Yusuf Omar, CEO of the BRCSOM Center for Strategic Studies in Somalia, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Somalia is not against Ethiopia’s trade or its access to the sea,” explaining that the problem begins “when interests turn into unilateral policies that ignore the sovereignty of neighbors and international law, and open the door to external forces in a highly sensitive region like the Red Sea.” And Bab al-Mandab.
Omar asked: “In light of the conflicts in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia; Why is resolving the internal Ethiopian crisis not a priority before expanding the arenas of regional conflict?” Pointing out that “the fragility of the Ethiopian interior has become part of the regional debate about the legitimacy and method of achieving Addis Ababa’s maritime ambitions.”
An analysis by the Chatham House Institute in London, published recently, indicates that “the conflict in Tigray and the deterioration of Ethiopian-Eritrean relations have become linked to each other, and that a widespread return to war in Tigray may extend beyond Ethiopia’s borders.”
The same applies to the “Renaissance Dam” file, which raises a dispute with Egypt and Sudan over the lack of agreement on how to manage and operate it. Hajar said, “The Ethiopian government raised the dam to the level of a symbol of national pride that everyone can rally around, at a time when the country was very divided, and used the conflict with Egypt and Sudan in a speech of national unity.”
But the current crisis, according to Hager, could push Ethiopian politics in two opposing directions. “Increases the incentive to take a tougher stance on sovereignty issues,” and on the other hand “makes the government very vulnerable with regard to its territorial ambitions.”
While Addis considers the dam and sea issues separate, Ali stressed that “maritime ambitions and (the Renaissance Dam) reinforce each other in the geopolitical competition, even if Addis Ababa presents them as two separate issues.” She attributed this to the regional alignment in the two files, and said that “internal crises may deepen the unrest in the Horn of Africa.”
Here, Shafie Yusuf Omar stressed that “it is in the interest of Somalia, Egypt, and the Arab world for Ethiopia to be stable and regionally responsible,” adding that “his country does not reject Ethiopia obtaining commercial access to the sea, just as it does not oppose its right to development,” but it refuses, as he put it, to let these demands turn into “a policy of imposing a fait accompli or a proxy conflict.”
He warned that “any expansion of the Ethiopian internal conflict, the cost of which will not remain confined within the country’s borders, given the size of Ethiopia and its geographical, demographic, and security intertwining with Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Red Sea.”
Hajar said: “The current tense internal situation in Ethiopia makes Abiy Ahmed’s government more fragile with regard to its ambitions to impose its influence as a regional power. “This makes it unable to compete with regional powers to a large extent.”
After months of skirmishes, the Tigray Liberation Front is heading into a new chapter of battles with the federal government in Ethiopia, which was strengthened by the joining of other forces by launching an armed coalition to overthrow the government, amid fears of the expansion of the scope of the fighting.
What is happening brings to mind the battles of 2020 between the two sides, which witnessed the killing of thousands and ended after mediations that culminated in the “Pretoria Agreement” in 2022, and since then that period has not been without accusations of violating the agreement from both sides.
An Ethiopian parliamentarian told Asharq Al-Awsat that the government will not repeat the scenario of the previous war, and the current unrest will not lead to a broader wave of clashes, and the battles will be resolved in a short period.
An Ethiopian analyst agreed with him, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, stressing that the “Tigray Front,” despite joining an armed coalition a few days ago, has internal rifts and a lack of equipment and weapons and is only stationed in 3 of the 12 regions in the region, ruling out the expansion of the war.
The conflict is expanding
On Friday, areas in northern Ethiopia witnessed an outage in internet service, according to the NetBlocks website, which specializes in monitoring network disturbances, as battles intensified between the federal government and the Tigray Liberation Front, according to what Agence France-Presse reported.
The “Tigray forces” seized 3 airports in the region, and launched attacks in the Afar and Amhara regions in cooperation with their allies there this week, in the most dangerous escalation since the devastating war that took place between 2020 and 2022 against the federal government forces.
The people fear a repeat of the scenario of communications outages and the blockade of supplies imposed by the federal government on the Tigray region during the recent civil war (2020-2022), which killed nearly 600,000 people.
This scenario also bears a resemblance this time to the “Tigray Liberation Front” repeating its strategy in the 2020 war, and its advance south through the Amhara region towards the capital, Addis Ababa, amid a possible goal of the attack in the Afar region, which is to cut off the supply lines coming from Djibouti, through which the vast majority of Ethiopia’s international trade shipments pass, including fuel.
The Front has already launched attacks on the Amhara and Afar regions, confirming that it is responding to attacks launched by federal forces.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Ethiopian parliamentarian Mohamed Nour Ahmed believes that the recent military developments in the Tigray region “will not return the country to the tragedy of the 2020 war, as a result of the decline in the capabilities of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and its loss of its popular incubator.” Where the people of the region are forcibly led into fighting amid popular dissatisfaction as a result of the repercussions of previous wars, the effects of which citizens have not yet avoided.”
The analyst on Ethiopian affairs, Abdul Shakur Abdul Samad, does not disagree with him, stressing that “what is being raised in the media regarding military developments in the Tigray region involves exaggeration and exaggerations that are contrary to reality,” noting that the field confrontations “are currently limited to only 3 fronts out of 12 fronts in the region, and what is happening is media employment and psychological warfare aimed at pressure and nothing more.”
A few days ago, 7 groups opposed to the federal government in different regions of the country, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the Fano militia in Amhara, and the Oromo Liberation Army, announced an alliance aimed at overthrowing the ruling authority in Addis Ababa.
The Tigray People's Liberation Front previously took power in 1991 and ruled Ethiopia for three decades before Abiy Ahmed marginalized it when he assumed the prime ministership in 2018, which contributed to the outbreak of civil war.
Although the “Pretoria Peace Agreement” in 2022 ended that war and established a cautious calm, the clashes renewed in late 2025. The federal government at that time launched drone strikes on Tigray and mobilized its forces on the borders of the region.
Fears are increasing that the conflict in Ethiopia will turn into a broader regional conflict, at a time when the “Tigray Liberation Front” enjoys support from Eritrea, which observers say is afraid of Ethiopia’s invasion of its lands with the aim of obtaining access to the Red Sea.
Despite this, Ethiopian parliamentarian Mohamed Nour Ahmed believes that the alliances between opposition factions “will be fragile and will deepen their isolation and cause them to lose any trust in the Ethiopian street,” stressing that the central government headed by Abiy Ahmed “is today more powerful and superior than ever before, thanks to the comprehensive development and modernization of the military arsenal with modern techniques and technology, compared to the beginning of the crisis in which he assumed power amid challenges and limited equipment.”
The Ethiopian parliamentarian asserts that “the ongoing confrontations will not go beyond limited rounds that will be resolved within a short period, and then Ethiopia will return to the path of stability and security.”
Abdel Samad ruled out the extension of the confrontations or the outbreak of a comprehensive war, based on the state of civil and military division that the Tigray People's Liberation Front is suffering from and the defection of its prominent field leaders, as well as the severe shortage of equipment and weapons compared to its situation in previous confrontations.
Crises
While about a million people are still displaced in the Tigray region, the situation with the new confrontations appears difficult, with the region’s residents rushing since Thursday to stock up on food, cash and basic goods. Samuel Gebre Selassie (37 years old), who works in a spice shop in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, told Agence France-Presse: “There are deep fears about the possibility of interruption of banking services, communications networks, electricity and supplies of basic goods again.”
Therefore, Ethiopian parliamentarian Mohamed Nour Ahmed confirms that the new alliances have no popular support and will quickly lose their influence.
Abdel Samad stressed that the declared alliances between a mere structure that was born dead do not reflect any real weight on the ground in light of these popular crises, stressing that the expected developments will not go beyond limited and limited security breaches or challenges, which may lead to some routine political and security consequences, without posing a threat beyond this scope.
