Iran is awaiting an American response to its proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, after talks held by mediators with the two parties in New York on Monday. This comes at a time when Tehran warned that the infrastructure in the region would not be safe.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said, after meeting with a Qatari mediator before leaving New York yesterday, that communications through mediators have become “more serious,” expressing his hope to receive the American response within a short time (by yesterday, Tuesday). He stressed that Tehran's positions have not changed. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman, Majid Al-Ansari, said that efforts are focused on “building common ground” and “bridging the gap.”
US President Donald Trump denied that he offered to ease sanctions or release frozen Iranian funds to end the war in exchange for nuclear steps, saying: “I did not offer them anything.”
In what appeared to be a threat to neighboring countries, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqir Qalibaf said: “In the region where we do not sell our oil, no one will sell oil, and if our security is not achieved, no infrastructure will be safe,” vowing a “harsh, precise and swift” response to any “aggression or adventure.”
In turn, Brian Katulis, from the Middle East Institute in the United States, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the two countries are in a “test of wills.” Farzin Nadimi, from the Washington Institute, believed that the Hormuz card had declined and not disappeared, while Barak Barfi, from the New America Foundation, suggested that resuming the fighting was closer than ending it.
US President Donald Trump's denial of his willingness to ease sanctions on Iran in exchange for nuclear concessions has brought uncertainty back to mediations searching for common ground between Washington and Tehran. Between American signals of negotiating flexibility, and Iranian adherence to lifting the blockade and restoring oil revenues, the dispute goes beyond the content of the settlement to the order of its implementation: Who will make the concession first? With what guarantees?
This stumble coincides with the improvement of oil flows from the region and the restoration of routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, which gives Washington a margin to continue pressure.
But the Iranian threat to target infrastructure sets limits to this bet, and raises a parallel question: Will weakening the navigation card facilitate the agreement, or push the confrontation towards production and export facilities?
After the Axios website quoted American officials as saying that Trump was willing to ease sanctions and release frozen Iranian funds in exchange for concrete steps in the nuclear file, the president denied these reports and considered them incorrect.
The contradiction came while Qatari and Pakistani mediators were trying to bring positions closer together through contacts with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and US administration officials.
An American official described the indirect talks as positive and constructive, noting Iranian flexibility regarding nuclear issues, but stressed the impossibility of an agreement without addressing them.
In the same context, Politico magazine quoted an Iranian official as saying that the instability of Trump’s position makes it difficult to determine what Washington can accept and turn the discussions into a practical arrangement.
Denial alone does not prove the collapse of communications or the closing of the door to easing sanctions in the future, but it leaves the mediators with a gap between what officials convey and what Trump announces, and it is difficult to confirm the economic compensation that Tehran is demanding.
Brian Katulis, a researcher at the Middle East Institute, describes Trump's statements as "almost meaningless," considering that trying to analyze every current situation is not very helpful, because little of what he has said since the outbreak of the war is related to reality, according to his assessment.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he believes that the two countries are still confronting and testing their wills, and this appears in the statements, while they are embodied in the field action and efforts to reach an agreement.
The proposals intersect when there is a need to reduce escalation, restore order in navigation, and keep the negotiating path open, but they differ in the starting point. Tehran wants priority to lift the blockade, ease sanctions, and release assets, while Washington clings to concrete nuclear steps and refuses to offer significant economic gains in exchange for a promise to resume negotiations.
Diplomatic sources say that the mediators are working to revive the “Islamabad Understanding” framework, which dealt with stopping military operations, navigation, the nuclear file, and sanctions. It was followed by talks in Switzerland that led to a political committee, working groups, monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms, and a line of communication to avoid misunderstandings.
The importance of returning to this framework is based on the existence of a previous negotiating structure, but the renewed confrontation revealed that establishing committees does not guarantee respect for commitments. An American official quoted by Axios accuses Iran of violating the previous understanding by firing on commercial ships in July, an accusation that increases Washington’s tightening of guarantees.
The latest Iranian proposal links the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to a cessation of fighting for 7 days and meeting economic and security demands, including ending the blockade. The US administration fears that it will make advance concessions while Tehran practically maintains the ability to control the corridor.
So, the dilemma seems to be as much about synchronization and verification as it is about goals: How do you link every economic move to a testable security or nuclear measure? This is an analytical need imposed by differences, and not an agreed-upon mechanism.
Researcher Katulis concludes at this point by saying that the lack of trust makes imagining an imminent agreement difficult.
In parallel with the negotiation, improved oil exports via alternative routes may change urgency calculations. Preliminary data from Kpler indicated that exports from major Middle Eastern producers in September were estimated at about 16.328 million barrels per day, including 9.719 million via Hormuz. It is necessary to separate the two numbers: the recovery of total exports does not mean the return of the Strait to its normal state, nor the disappearance of supply risks.
Farzin Nadimi, senior researcher on Iranian affairs at the Washington Institute, believes that these paths greatly reduce Hormuz’s card, but do not resolve it. He indicated in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that the Saudi and Emirati pipelines already transport a large share of the two countries’ oil away from the strait, and that expansions scheduled during 2027-2029 may allow Hormuz to exceed quantities equivalent to about 60 percent of its usual oil flows, according to his estimate.
He adds that the markets have adapted, and the closure no longer creates the global shock that Tehran seeks. However, Kuwaiti exports, Qatari liquefied natural gas, and most Iraqi exports remain at risk, as well as the possibility of targeting alternative infrastructure. Therefore, the Iranian card declined and did not disappear.
Ndimi stresses that sanctions and a naval blockade are not yet sufficient to impose real and permanent nuclear concessions. The financial pressure is real, but the regime has tolerated it so far, although its intensification may change that. The remaining ability to obstruct, escalate, and bear economic pain limits the effectiveness of the strategy, narrowing Tehran's options in the short and medium term without forcing it alone to concede.
The warning from Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf came on Tuesday to reveal this aspect of the confrontation. He linked the security of regional infrastructure to ensuring Iran's security, threatening that preventing it from selling oil would prevent others as well. The threat indicates that the decline in the effectiveness of disrupting navigation may be offset by an expansion of the range of potential targets.
In this context, Barak Barfi, a researcher at the New America Foundation, said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that Trump seems to acknowledge the impossibility of reaching an agreement in the current circumstances, and is moving towards resuming the bombing after the midterm elections, when the internal pressures on him subside.
It is believed that the Iranians reached the same conclusion from the opposite position: disrupting Hormuz has lost its effectiveness, in his estimation, while the American blockade increases the pressure on Tehran. Therefore, it is likely that both sides have come to realize that resuming hostilities is the most likely possibility now, rather than ending the fighting.
But on the other hand, Iran's threat to raise the cost to neighboring countries does not mean that it will not expose them to a broader response, and it may expand the circle of countries opposed and ready to confront this escalation. Instead of intimidating the countries of the region, this may prompt them to respond and escalate the confrontation. However, increased economic pressure does not automatically mean that the Iranian regime is ready for nuclear concessions or is close to collapse.
Matthew Gould, a former British diplomat, believes in an opinion article in the Washington Post that regime change requires, in addition to ongoing protests, the cracking of the security services and the ruling elite, and that American bombing and encouragement alone are not enough.
The task of the mediators remains to transform pressure into mutual, implementable commitments, before the improvement in oil flow becomes a reason to prolong the confrontation, and the threats turn into a new round of escalation.
