Guatemala is Taiwan's largest ally in Central America. (Reuters)
[Financial Channel/Comprehensive Report] Experts pointed out that on the eve of Guatemala’s 2027 election, China will exert pressure and influence, trying to build a support network through business, political and media relations, and steal Taiwan’s most powerful ally in Central America.
Experts consulted by Centroamérica360 warn that China is deploying various influence mechanisms in the run-up to the 2027 elections in Guatemala, Taiwan’s largest ally in Central America, including economic pressure, access to politicians and journalists, soft power strategies, and narratives that favor diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Analysts said Guatemala will hold elections on June 27, 2027, and the issue of relations with the Asian giant will be on the agenda during the campaign. They warn that China's commitments are essentially the same as those made to other Central American countries, which have been shockingly broken and bounced.
Dr. Evan Ellis, a Latin American relations expert at the U.S. Army War College, said, "I think that for China, the most important election in Central America in recent years is the Guatemala election. Based on my past observations of China's behavioral patterns, China will definitely show a strong interest in the Guatemala election. Therefore, if a candidate emerges who may change Sino-US relations, China will be very concerned."
Ellis believes China is equally capable of backing radical left-wing candidates with similar ideologies, or right-wing candidates with a reputation for corruption who may fear U.S. sanctions. Historically, Ellis explained, China has been very cautious about publicly influencing a country to directly change foreign relations, but now it uses local media and political tactics to do so.
Ellis pointed out that China has been funding visits to China by multi-party delegations from Guatemala’s Congress and mayors’ visits to China, in addition to supporting congressmen to attend the Latin American Congress.
Another expert, Lourdes Balconi, explained to Centroamérica360 that long-term visits to China by journalists and influential people are another means of influencing public opinion. He said these people would then create an "echo chamber effect" on social media, amplifying statements that are beneficial to relations with Beijing as Guatemala is about to hold a new round of elections. "It's all about these acts of influence, about gaining influence in the electoral process," he warned.
Balconi's analysis is based on the experience of other Central American countries that severed ties with Taiwan and then established diplomatic ties with China, notably Honduras, El Salvador and Panama. He believes that Beijing is implementing a long-term strategy and is paying close attention to any decisions Guatemala may make in terms of foreign policy.
China has also become an economic coercion force in countries such as Guatemala. In 2024, the Chinese government banned the export of coffee and Hawaiian beans to Guatemala when Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Ramiro Martinez attended the inauguration of Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te and President Bernardo Arevalo reiterated support for relations with Taiwan. Guatemala accused China of diplomatic blackmail.
Balconi recalled: "Following the coffee and Hawaiian beans incidents in 2024, Chinese customs began to block or exert pressure to prevent Guatemalan products from entering China." He suggested that trade pressure could affect businessmen who have the ability to influence the decisions of the next administration.
Balconi explained that these measures would not necessarily require an outright trade ban, but rather the erection of sanitary, phytosanitary or customs barriers to delay Guatemalan goods from entering the Chinese market. She analyzed that this situation may be particularly important on the eve of a presidential candidate debate or meeting.
Balconi added: "It is likely that there will be more similar incidents, putting great pressure on business leaders who will ultimately influence the decisions of the next government. Considering the other cases I mentioned, it would not be surprising if this happened before the most important debates or candidates' rallies."
Balconi believes this will be accompanied by a shift in the public debate about China and Taiwan. The discussion may gradually shift away from democracy versus authoritarianism and toward narratives of development versus economic stagnation. In this case, the argument that Guatemala is unable to obtain free trade agreements and take advantage of greater commercial opportunities due to its lack of diplomatic relations with China will be more convincing.
However, Balconi questioned whether establishing diplomatic relations and reaching a trade agreement with China would automatically guarantee strong export growth. Citing the example of Costa Rica, whose free trade agreement with China has been in effect for 14 years, she explained that Costa Rica's exports to China have increased fivefold, but exports still account for a relatively small proportion of its economy.
The situation is similar in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. China dumps large amounts of products into the local market, but purchases less than 2% of its total exports from these three countries.
In 2025, Taiwan's imports from Guatemala are more than twice that of China, exceeding China's imports from Honduras and El Salvador. In 2025, Guatemala's exports to Taiwan reached US$127.2 million, solidifying Taiwan's position as one of the leading export destinations for Guatemalan products in Asia, far exceeding the trade performance of Honduras and El Salvador with the People's Republic of China.
The figures contrast sharply with two countries in the Northern Triangle that severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of establishing diplomatic ties with China. In 2025, the combined export value of Honduras and El Salvador to the Chinese market was slightly more than US$102.9 million, which is lower than Guatemala's export value to Taiwan.
