The media advisor to the Eritrean embassy in Cairo, Habib Muhammad Othman, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Monday that his country does not rule out a war with Ethiopia, and is preparing to defend itself, indicating that it rejects Addis Ababa’s “lies” and will not accept Addis Ababa’s influence in the Red Sea.
Regarding Ethiopia’s accusations against Eritrea of destabilizing it, he stressed that “what Addis Ababa is currently saying are unacceptable allegations, and reality does not accept them, because Eritrea has not announced that it wants to invade Ethiopia, or any of the Ethiopian regions, or threaten Addis Ababa, but rather the opposite is true.”
The media advisor explained that “Ethiopia is the one that turned friendly relations since the arrival of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 into a stage of hostility with its repeated announcement that it wants the Eritrean port of Assab, and that Ethiopia cannot live without this port, and it began to adopt a hostile position towards Asmara.”
Regarding the future of tension between Asmara and Addis Ababa, and the possibility of confrontation, the media advisor to the Eritrean embassy in Cairo stressed that “his country is in a state of constant readiness for confrontation and to defend itself against Ethiopia at any time, especially with the Ethiopian expansion policy and Abiy Ahmed’s aspiration to control the port of Assab,” adding: “We are ready for that.”
Regarding the possibility of changing Asmara’s view towards the sea port for Ethiopia, which it seeks as it is a landlocked country since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Osman added: “Our position will not change, and no country in the world will accept to give part of its land to another country,” stressing the possibility of Addis Ababa obtaining commercial use of ports in Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. But it is unacceptable to build military bases and military influence in the Red Sea.
Regarding the tripartite alliance between Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, he stressed that “it is not directed against anyone, and they have common interests in the Red Sea,” adding that “our position is clear regarding the sovereignty and unity of Somalia and Sudan, and achieving peace in the region.”
Regarding Asmara’s view of the movements of the Ethiopian Armed Alliance, he explained: “The civil war in Ethiopia is a long and old war for peoples who want the right to self-determination, because the Ethiopian Empire annexed them by force. Now the life of that empire seems to have begun to end, and Ethiopia is in the stage of collapse,” pointing out that “the empire was built on two main pillars, the Amhara and the Tigray, and they and others are now searching for the right to self-determination, and this is a new stage that means that Ethiopia has now reached a stage.” Disintegration.
He added: “This will constitute a danger to the region and to Asmara (...), so Eritrea, by the way, is taking whatever measures it deems appropriate to confront this, and will not remain silent, and supports all the forces that it believes are protecting its interests, and they do not have ambitions with us, and this is a natural thing, and the right of any country, especially since Abiy Ahmed threatens the independence of Eritrea,” according to his opinion.
Othman explained that Western, European and international demands for calm in Ethiopia “are a natural thing, because these countries have interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.” But the field reality inside Ethiopia is ultimately the ruling, not the appeals.” He believes that the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Tigray in 2022 “is practically over, and if a dialogue occurs, a new agreement must be reached, because there is a broad armed coalition fighting the central government in Ethiopia, and it also has demands.”
He doubted the occurrence of understandings between the coalition and the federal government, given that the former aims to overthrow the latter, stressing that the clash has expanded more than in 2020, which was between the government and Tigray, and “now it has become a comprehensive war, and the possibility of the fall of Abiy Ahmed is possible,” he said.
Regarding the possibility of a war between Asmara and Addis Ababa, Othman continued, saying: “It is possible and not excluded, especially since Addis Ababa has already declared war against Eritrea and the port of Assab.”
Ethiopia has become a landlocked country since 1993, when Eritrea gained its independence after a three-decade war, and it depends on the ports of its neighbors, especially the port of Djibouti.
On Sunday, Mauritanian Coast Guard units rescued 260 irregular migrants after spotting two boats off the coast of the capital, Nouakchott, who had sailed from the city of Banjul, the capital of Gambia, on their way to the Spanish Canary Islands.
A press briefing issued by the Coast Guard stated that the two boats spent about seven days at sea before naval units were able to spot them and intervene to rescue everyone on board.
According to the statement, the people rescued are 132 Senegalese, 120 from Gambia, 4 from Guinea, two from Nigeria, and two from Mali. Among them were 61 women and 17 children.
This comes in the context of a remarkable increase in the movement of migratory boats on the Mauritanian coast, which has become the most prominent crossing point on the “Atlantic Route” towards the Spanish Canary Islands.
Since the beginning of this year, until mid-July, the Mauritanian authorities recorded 17 landing operations in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, which allowed the rescue of 2,147 migrants, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
On the 21st of the same month, UNHCR announced the death or loss of 144 migrants in three successive rescue operations off the Mauritanian coast within one week. Most of them were in a boat that set off from the Buffaloto region in Gambia. It remained lost at sea for 25 days before it was found, and only 38 people survived.
On June 7, the Coast Guard announced the killing of a migrant and the rescue of 192 others off Nouakchott, in the second operation of its kind in just five days, after rescuing 110 migrants of African nationalities after their boat broke down.
On August 21, the Coast Guard rescued more than 300 migrants, including 40 children, from an overcrowded wooden boat off the port of Nouadhibou, a few days after rescuing 42 other migrants from a broken down boat.
This frequency of rescue operations, which are sometimes only a few days apart, reflects mounting pressure on the capabilities of the Mauritanian Coast Guard, at a time when human rights organizations indicate that the official numbers of survivors hide a darker reality of deaths and cases of loss in the open ocean.
According to the non-governmental organization Caminando Fronteras, more than 1,300 migrants died while trying to reach the Spanish coast during the first five months of this year.
The active smuggling networks on this axis are dominated by the use of overcrowded traditional wooden boats, most of which depart from Banjul in Gambia, and the coasts of Senegal and Guinea, on trips that may extend for weeks without adequate reserves of water, food, and fuel, which exposes their passengers to serious risks in the event of engine failure or a deviation in the route.
The increasing security pressures in Morocco and Mauritania, with European support, have prompted some of these networks to move their starting points south towards Gambia and Guinea, according to what is monitored by organizations specialized in monitoring migration movements.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees describes the “Atlantic Route” as “one of the most dangerous migration corridors in the world,” due to the long distances, difficult maritime forecasts, overcrowding of unseaworthy boats, and limited opportunities for quick access for rescue operations.
The rise of three of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s sons, commander of the Libyan National Army, to influential positions in the military and development scenes in eastern Libya has raised questions about the nature of the relationship between them, and whether it is a “competition” for “centers of influence” or a distribution of roles within one central leadership.
In recent years, the presence of Haftar’s sons in leadership positions within influential institutions has increased. Saddam (the youngest son) has held the position of Deputy Commander of the “National Army” since the summer of last year, while his brother Khaled holds the position of Chief of the General Staff, while Al-Qasim has been managing the “Libya Reconstruction Fund” since February 2024, which Parliament granted him broad powers in the reconstruction file.
As for Siddiq and Uqba Haftar, they appear in less influential positions. The first is active in tribal mediations for “national reconciliation,” while the second works in the fields of technology and digital transformation.
Last week, the movements of 86 representatives to amend the bylaws of the House of Representatives, which might open the way for changing its president, Aguila Saleh, raised questions about the possibility of a discrepancy between Saddam and Khaled, whether among local activists or in international media.
According to the Africa Intelligence website, Saddam supported these parliamentary moves, while reports spoke of Khaled’s role in “preventing the session from being held, and his support of Aguila Saleh in the presidency of the Council.” The French newspaper Le Monde also previously shed light on this potential competition, in a report published last month.
Speculations and hypotheses
Among Libyans, there are those who agree with the view that there is a “competition,” or even a “struggle for influence.” Libyan political analyst Muhammad Mahfouz believes that “it has reached an unprecedented escalation, between a project led by Saddam Haftar versus Khaled and Balqasim.”
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mahfouz highlighted “previous signs of this conflict that were brought to public by the last session of Parliament, and which turned into a fight between bloggers affiliated with both parties,” a point of view with which Jalal Harchaoui, an associate researcher at the British Royal United Services Institute, agrees.
On the other hand, sources close to the leadership of the National Army spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat that this hypothesis is “incorrect,” and that the matter does not go beyond the distribution of tasks within one central command.
Military researcher close to the National Army, Muhammad Al-Tarhouni, believes that “differences in viewpoints between leaders on some issues are not excluded, but reaching a disagreement or public conflict is unlikely.”
Al-Tarhouni believes, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that there is competition “over achievement and not influence,” considering that the movements of Khaled and Saddam aim to “protect the future of the military institution and prevent attempts by some political forces to influence the general leadership.”
Saddam's appointment as deputy commander of the National Army in the summer of last year early opened the door to speculation about the future of the leadership in eastern Libya. The American Simpson Research Center presented a reading about the possibility of consolidating Saddam's position in the path of the caliphate, in exchange for what this might lead to the marginalization of his brother Khaled, despite his assuming the position of chief of staff.
Questions increased about Saddam's role in the future with the "American initiative" to unify institutions and executive authority in Libya, with media reports circulating about leaks regarding a proposed formula requiring Saddam to assume the presidency of the Presidential Council, in exchange for Abdul Hamid Al-Dabaiba assuming the presidency of the unified government.
“Clear hierarchy”
Last April, statements attributed to Khaled Haftar were issued talking about “the refusal to continue any political arrangements supported by external agendas that would prolong the crisis,” which was understood at the time as an indication of rejection of the initiative of the US President’s Advisor for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos.
But political researcher Muhammad Mutairid believes that the position of the leadership of the “National Army” welcoming the “American initiative,” issued two months later, denies this hypothesis. In his testimony to Asharq Al-Awsat, he cited “an unannounced meeting in the media two weeks ago between Khaled and Saddam to discuss the latest developments.”
Al-Tarhouni believes that both Saddam and Khaled belong to “a disciplined military institution, based on a clear hierarchy in issuing and implementing orders,” adding: “We have not yet seen direct interference from Khaled and Saddam in the political scene, or movements that indicate the existence of declared competition between them.”
Regarding Al-Qasim, Al-Tarhouni said that his work in the “Libya Reconstruction Fund” focuses on implementing projects and advancing the development process in the east of the country.
The Libyan Center for Security and Military Studies has previously raised the possibility of the emergence of a conflict that goes beyond competition between sons, within scenarios related to the future of leadership.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, political analyst close to the National Army, Abdullah Al-Dibani, downplayed the possibilities of a future conflict between Haftar’s sons, considering that “the distribution of tasks is taking place according to one central vision; The military, security and development roles proceed within a complementary framework and do not mean there is competition for influence.”
Amid talk of “possible competition and distribution of roles,” the positions of Haftar’s sons remain influential in reading the future of leadership in eastern Libya, without conclusive evidence, so far, of the existence of a conflict between them.
