A day after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi called on Parliament to authorize him to take “any necessary measures” to defend Saudi Arabia if it requested it, Cairo began completing the necessary constitutional procedures, as the National Defense Council agreed, on Sunday, to provide all forms of support to the Kingdom in the face of Houthi attacks, while the House of Representatives postponed resolving the issue until Monday after an emergency session devoted to discussing it.
Al-Sisi announced, on Saturday, that Egypt would not stand “idly by” in what he described as a threat to Saudi Arabia’s security, stressing that any potential military intervention would be defensive and would not aim to attack or wage war.
These steps come in light of the escalation of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent weeks, including targeting King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and facilities belonging to Aramco, amid growing concerns about the security of navigation in the Red Sea and its repercussions on the movement of trade and energy in the region.
The recent Egyptian moves have raised questions about the nature of the support that Cairo can provide to Riyadh and the limits of any possible military participation, and whether they represent a shift in Egyptian policy or an extension of previous positions towards the security of the Gulf states.
'It's not a radical shift'
Ahmed Abu Douh, a researcher in Middle East affairs at the Chatham House Institute, believes that the Egyptian move does not represent a radical shift in Egyptian foreign policy, but rather an extension of a policy based on achieving a balance between avoiding involvement in broad military alliances similar to the “Mecca Pact,” which was recently established in the absence of Cairo, and maintaining strategic partnerships, especially with the Gulf states.
The head of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, Samir Ragheb, believes that the Egyptian President’s statements came after understandings that took place during the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Cairo in the middle of last month, after which the two sides confirmed that the current regional circumstances require greater coordination and solidarity between the two countries, and stressed the congruence of visions regarding a number of regional files.
The visit of the Saudi Crown Prince at that time came as the Kingdom sought to expand the circle of regional support, following reports indicating that US President Donald Trump rejected a request from Mohammed bin Salman to carry out American strikes against the Houthis, before he later offered to help identify targets and exchange intelligence information, and called on the Kingdom to accept Israel’s assistance in confronting the Houthi attacks, in light of Saudi Arabia’s adherence to rejecting normalization with Israel.
Defensive support, not ground war
While those who spoke to the BBC were unanimous in ruling out sending Egyptian forces to fight inside Yemen, they differed in estimating the size of potential military support and its limits.
Abu Douh clearly ruled out repeating the experience of Egyptian military intervention in Yemen in the 1960s, considering that the cost of that experience still affects Egyptian strategic thinking.
Ragheb points out that Egypt has the ability to provide multiple forms of military support, including naval and air forces, air defense systems and even special units, within the Saudi borders.
Former parliamentarian and security expert Tamer El-Shahawy believes that the Egyptian message revolves around protecting Saudi Arabia and not engaging in an offensive war. In his opinion, potential forms of support may include the exchange of intelligence information, logistical, training and technological support, and perhaps other forms of military support if circumstances require it.
As for former Major General in the Saudi Army, Abdullah Ghanem Al-Qahtani, he believes that Saudi Arabia possesses the necessary capabilities and alliances to protect its security, the latest of which is the “Mecca Joint Defense Pact,” which was signed last August and also includes Türkiye and Pakistan, although it has not been activated.
Al-Qahtani believes that the Egyptian role currently required is mainly political support, considering that the Egyptian President’s statements represent clear messages of deterrence to those who threaten maritime navigation. He says: “The importance of the Egyptian position lies in its political and strategic weight.”
Houthi warning
Before the upcoming session of the Egyptian Parliament, to discuss the mandate, the Speaker of the Yemeni House of Representatives affiliated with the Houthis sent a message to the Egyptian House of Representatives, saying: “We categorically reject Egypt’s involvement in Arabism and history in a battle that does not resemble its values,” and he warned of the consequences of this path, adding: “Its slipping down this path will pose a grave danger to its national security and internal stability, and ancient Egypt is well aware of who its real enemies are and who is working to tear the nation apart.”
For his part, Ragheb downplayed the impact of any potential Houthi threats on the Egyptian decision or the country's security, considering that the security of navigation, the Egyptian economy, and common interests with Saudi Arabia make confronting these threats necessary. He says, "Every decision has a cost, but the repercussions of not supporting Saudi Arabia are more dangerous than the repercussions of supporting it."
Former Saudi Major General Abdullah Al-Ghanim Al-Qahtani considers that the stability of the Red Sea represents a direct Egyptian interest before it is a support for Riyadh, given the close connection between the security of Bab al-Mandab and the trade movement through the Suez Canal, which represents a vital commercial corridor and a major source of foreign exchange for Egypt.
As for Abu Douh, he believes that there is a ceiling on any possible Egyptian military involvement, in light of Cairo’s efforts to maintain its role as a mediator between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Houthis.
The researcher at the Chatham House Institute believes that any potential Egyptian military contribution may be focused on two main areas: protecting the sea lanes in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, thus strengthening Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa, and strengthening air defense capabilities to confront missiles and drones that pose the most prominent threat to Saudi territory and its vital installations.
Support matched by economic cooperation?
Since the Egyptian President announced his country's readiness to defend the Kingdom, positions have varied between supporters who considered this a commitment to support the "brothers," and opponents who rejected any open authorization for military intervention without specific goals, stressing that "the sons of Egypt are not mercenaries," after they linked the Egyptian position to the Gulf aid that Cairo had previously received.
In his speech on Saturday, the Egyptian President referred to the “Gulf positions of support” for Egypt, saying: “We must acknowledge the kindness done by the brothers in the Gulf, and thank them for their support for Egypt after 2013,” pointing out that “the support of the brothers in the Gulf for Egypt played a vital role in restoring the capabilities of the Egyptian state.”
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided Egypt billions of dollars in aid, central bank deposits and investments after the army ousted former President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, following popular protests.
The total value of Saudi deposits with the Central Bank of Egypt is about $10.3 billion, including $5 billion short-term deposits, in addition to deposits amounting to $5.3 billion that are due this month.
Abu Douh does not rule out that any additional security or military rapprochement between Cairo and Riyadh will be reflected in the level of economic cooperation, whether through new investments or extending Saudi deposits with the Central Bank of Egypt, especially in light of Cairo’s efforts to attract more foreign investments, but he rules out that there will be a direct “deal.”
Al-Qahtani rejects the link between Egyptian political or military support and Saudi aid and investments, considering that the relations between the two countries are based on a strategic and historical partnership that goes beyond the logic of direct barter or exchange of immediate benefits.
