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Egyptian position

In the face of these Ethiopian efforts, the Egyptian position was explicitly rejecting Ethiopia's access to a sea port, without linking this to its dispute with Addis Ababa with the water issue.

Regarding the sea port that Ethiopia wants, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati said in statements last September 10, “There are sovereign countries that have ports on the Red Sea, and no one has the power to grant any country military sea access, otherwise it will be chaos, especially since many African countries are landlocked.”

In late August, Abdel Ati stressed, during a phone call with US Presidential Advisor Massad Boulos, “the necessity of respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, and refraining from any unilateral moves that would threaten regional peace and security, or seeking to impose maritime access by force in violation of the rules of international law.”

Abdel Ati also stressed, in other statements, that the countries overlooking the Red Sea are sovereign over its ports, and that no country can be granted a military sea port, warning that otherwise would open the door to chaos, while stressing that there is no problem in the commercial access of landlocked countries.

Although Abdel-Ati did not name the intended countries, he said in October 2025 that “Egypt rejects Ethiopia’s entry into the governance of the Red Sea coasts.” This Egyptian rejection of Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea is repeated, and during Abdel Ati’s meeting last May with Yemeni Prime Minister Shaye’ al-Zindani in Cairo, the issue of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was discussed. Abdel Ati stressed at the time “Egypt’s categorical rejection of any efforts to internationalize or militarize the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well as the refusal of any parties outside of it to engage in arrangements concerning it.”

Also, during Abdel Ati’s visit to Asmara last May, he met with Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, and they stressed that the security and management of the Red Sea “remains the exclusive responsibility of the countries riparian to it, and that Egypt rejects any attempts by non-riparian parties to impose security arrangements or roles in this context,” according to a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry at the time.

On the other hand, Nebiat Getachew, spokesman for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said last May that the Egyptian government “is trying to encircle and obstruct his country’s access to the Red Sea.” Although he did not specify details, he stressed that Ethiopia will continue to work hard to obtain a sea port through peaceful and sustainable routes.

Here, African affairs expert Dr. Ramadan Qarni warns that Egypt does not mind Addis Ababa obtaining a commercial outlet according to legal frameworks sponsored by neighboring countries, as previously proposed by Djibouti and rejected by Ethiopia. “But Cairo is strictly confronting military efforts, in anticipation of the repercussions of opening ports on the Red Sea that would harm Arab and African national security, especially with parties such as Israel entering the crisis line and the Houthi groups supporting threats to Bab al-Mandab.”

The Egyptian expert believes that despite the media and diplomatic mobilization of Abiy Ahmed’s government, the chances of seizing a permanent military foothold on the Red Sea remain surrounded by complex challenges. Most notable is the international and regional rejection by the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which supports Somalia’s sovereignty. This is in addition to Addis Ababa’s fear of African isolation and harming its position as the headquarters of the African Union institutions, and the continued internal pressures amid the worsening Ethiopian economic and security crises in regions such as Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray, in addition to the tension in its relations with neighboring countries (Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia).

Qarni asserts that Cairo “succeeded in building a solid wall of regional and international intelligence and political consensus, blocking any unilateral steps, ensuring the preservation of national security and the protection of the region’s vital waterways.”

The Eritrean-Somali position

On the other hand, the Eritrean-Somali position has a remarkable presence among those who reject this Ethiopian path regarding the sea port.

Mogadishu strongly responded to a memorandum of understanding that Addis Ababa signed with the separatist region of Somaliland in 2024, according to which it would be able to access the port of Berbera. It issued a presidential decision to cancel the agreement, amid Arab support, especially Egypt, for this rejection, before Türkiye intervened through mediation at the end of that year and that effort disappeared from view.

Also, Eritrea, the owner of the port of Assab, which accuses Ethiopia of looking to control it again, has rejected that path more than once. One of the most prominent positions was Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s accusation, during July 2025, of Ethiopia of seeking to destabilize regional stability under slogans related to water and demanding an outlet on the Red Sea, considering this demand “a pretext for fueling conflicts.” At that time, Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel described the Ethiopian speech regarding the sea port as “recklessness and a return to beating the drums of war,” stressing that the sovereignty of Eritrea and its coasts was not subject to review.

Last May, Nebiat Getachew, spokesman for the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, likened Cairo’s movements within countries in the region, including Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya, to “an attempt to besiege Ethiopia and prevent it from reaching a sea port.”

According to Qarni, the agreement crisis between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region constituted a strategic shift in the Horn of Africa region, and a major driver of Egyptian foreign policy in the region. This development came as a “real alarm bell” that prompted Cairo to take intensive, multi-track action to protect its national security and the security of the region.

He pointed out that this was translated into partnerships with Eritrea and Somalia, and in a tripartite alliance and almost complete agreement between Egypt and the three main partners (Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia) on the idea of ​​the exclusive right of the riparian countries regarding the coastal outlet or the presence of coasts on the shore of the Red Sea.

Israeli support

On the other hand, during last September, the Ethiopian News Agency reported that Israel announced its diplomatic support for Ethiopia’s efforts to secure a port to the sea, and quoted the Israeli ambassador to Ethiopia, Avraham Negusi, as saying that his country stands strongly alongside Ethiopia’s efforts to secure a sea port to the Red Sea. The ambassador continued to the Ethiopian News Agency, “Empowering and strengthening Ethiopia and achieving stability in the Red Sea is in the interest of everyone, not Ethiopia alone, and Israel stands alongside Ethiopia in this effort.”

This is not the first position that Negusi has put forward in situations related to tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. Last August, he said in a press statement that Israel “will continue to strengthen its support for Ethiopia, with the aim of helping it become a leading economic power on the African continent.” At that time, Ambassador Mohamed Al-Orabi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and head of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, warned of the repercussions of the Israeli statements, indicating in previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat that they “will not undermine and will not change” Egypt’s positions.

Qarni, for his part, does not believe that this Israeli support will change Egypt’s firm position in rejecting Ethiopia’s sea port, stressing that Israel only wants to put pressure on Egypt on other issues, but the Egyptian state is capable of protecting its rights.

On the other hand, Abdel Moneim Abu Idris, an expert in African affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Addis Ababa obtaining a sea port in light of its current tensions with its neighbors is difficult, especially since it is accused by Sudan of supporting the Rapid Support militia.

He stressed that Egypt could not allow an Ethiopian military presence on the Sudanese coast or the Red Sea. Out of concern for its national security and the security of the region.

But the Ethiopian parliamentarian, Mohamed Nour Ahmed, sees the possibility of achieving this, noting that his country’s government is working to persuade the parties and neighboring countries to review their positions and engage in understandings that advance everyone’s interests.