The Iryo train alerted the control center that it was stopped due to a failure of the LZB track signaling system before being hit by the AVE

The second major train accident in nine months on the Spanish high-speed system threatens to exceed the number of victims of the one that occurred in January in Adamuz (Córdoba), whose investigation continues focused on a rail break as the main reason.

In this second case of Urda (Toledo), the first investigations indicate that coordination failures in traffic management at point 119,700 of the Madrid Seville line, an Adif Train overtaking and parking position, were what led to a Renfe AVE hitting an Iryo at more than 100 kilometers per hour that was stopped to make way for a third train.

Railway systems have several layers of safety systems, on board the train, on the tracks and from traffic control centers. The circumstances that have occurred in Urda point, according to sources familiar with the incident who clarify that four hours after the accident is a very short period of time to determine the causes, that there were security failures in more than one layer, without specifying whether they were system or human.

The reason for the accident is that the Iryo and the AVE received different information, one being stopped and the other traveling at more than 100 kilometers per hour on the same road. The signaling system present in this accident is the LZB, which maintains permanent communication along the entire track by means of an inductor cable (radiant wire) laid between the rails. The driver of the Iryo, as this newspaper has learned, issued a notice warning that its LZB system was failing and the train had stopped.