The investigation initiated by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, in which the suspects Eda Aydoğan, Güner Eke, İnönü Akgün Alp and Zehra Yılmaz were referred to the criminal judgeship of peace with a request for arrest, and Zeki Özcan and Mehmet Yazıcı for judicial control, continues. The referral letter prepared by the prosecutor's office requesting the arrest of 4 suspects has been accessed. The article included findings about the companies named AGMLAB AŞ and MRD AŞ, which were appointed trustees in the investigation regarding the crime of "obtaining confidential information of the state for the purpose of political espionage".
In the letter, it was stated that the 1-year maintenance and maintenance contract in the June period of 2011-2012 expired on June 30, 2012, and in this context, it was decided to hold the "MASAK Information Systems Software Development 2012 Maintenance, Operation Support and Service Procurement Tender", and that after June 20, 2012, this tender was awarded directly to AGMLAB AŞ.
In the article, it is stated that this company developed the Integrated Financial Intelligence System (EMİS) software used by MASAK between 2012 and 2018, that when looking at their partnership or management status, AGMLAB AŞ, MRD AŞ and Barış Ata AŞ are related companies, especially since 2010, the partners constantly move among them by buying and selling shares, and Barış Ata AŞ, which operates in the education sector, on 23 July 2016. It was stated that it was closed with the "Decree Law No. 667" published in the Official Gazette.
In the article, it is stated that many of the company's partners were senior managers in various positions in the secret structure of FETO, that most of them fled Türkiye before or immediately after the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and that Hakan Çiçek (the so-called civilian imam of the Naval Forces Command), one of the company's partners, was captured at Akıncılar Base. İsmail Kokuroğlu, who is in the partnership structure of all three companies, was the so-called civilian imam of the Naval Forces Command before this person, and many others. It was stated that the partner was active within the organization as "informatics imam" or "gendarmerie civilian imam in different periods".
In the article, it was stated that MASAK carried out the duties given to it by the legislation regarding the "irregular interrogation" actions that led to the start of the investigation, through the network infrastructure within the institution using the interrogation program called EMİS, that interrogations of persons and institutions on the PEP (Politically Exposed Persons List) list were subject to a special procedure, and that the PEP system was put into operation on August 4, 2015, with the consent of the then MASAK President İbrahim Hakkı Polat.
In the article, it is stated that due to the problems experienced in the update, it was disabled on September 2, 2016, with the approval of the then MASAK President Osman Dereli, that the deactivation of the system in question was not notified to any personnel within the institution, and that there were no inquiries from people with political population between 4 August 2015 and 2 September 2016. "The PEP system was disabled between 2 September 2016 and 31 December 2018, It has been understood that their families are the most interrogated time periods, and the PEP system was updated on December 31, 2018. In this context, our Chief Public Prosecutor's Office has started investigations against the suspects whose clear identity information is written below, for the crime of 'obtaining confidential information of the state for the purpose of political espionage'." statements were included.
QUESTIONING OF GOVERNMENT HEADS FROM EMIS
In the article, it was stated that the queries of individuals and institutions on the PEP list are subject to a special procedure, that the system gives a warning if the person on the list is wanted to be interrogated, and that if the authorized person continues the interrogation, an e-mail is sent to his superiors for informational purposes.
In the article, which stated that September 2016 and December 2018 were the time periods when President Erdoğan, his relatives and some ministers were questioned the most, "Although it was stated that these interrogations were due to collective interrogation, the report of DDK (State Supervisory Board) stated that Mr. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was also interrogated individually, without collective interrogation, on his direct identification number and tax identification number, and regarding these issues, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office stated in 2019 and "It has been understood that a KYOK (non-prosecution) decision was made within the scope of the investigations carried out in 2020." information was given.
In the article, it was stated that these companies were established for the purpose of "infiltrating the software of strategic institutions and accessing sensitive state data."
FETO CONNECTIONS OF THE SUSPECTS
The suspects in the file are Abdurrahman Özkan, Bekir Özel, Emir Üner, Erdal Çoban, Erhan Doğruöz, Faik Akbaba, Gökhan Çelik, Güngör Tıraş, Hakan Çiçek, İrfan Hacan, İshak Uysal, İsmail Gül, İsmail Kokuroğlu, Kerim Özkaynak, Lütfi Ruhioğlu, Mehmet Sami Kuzey, Mustafa Durap, Onur Gökdemir and Sadettin Özkan for a certain purpose. It was emphasized in the article that the employees of public institutions or organizations belonging to the same organization, through the companies they founded, also financed the organization with the tenders they received from public institutions and organizations through/with the mediation/assistance of Faruk Eliyioğlu and Kemalettin Kolutek.
In the article, it was explained that these public institutions and organizations assigned their own engineers and software developers, Atilla Tanrıkulu, Kubilay Can Tıraş, Hasan Demir and Gökhan Kesici, and that they did not record the logs and traces of Eda Aydoğan, Etem Volkan Çevik, Güner Eke, Özlem Dobur and Zehra Yılmaz (Keziban Karakoç) and AGMLAB staff Kesici in order to prevent their movements on the systems' databases from being detected.
In the article, it is pointed out that the suspects questioned the information of critical people and committed "the crime of disrupting the information system, destroying or changing the data" by deleting or changing the log records related to them, and that the suspects, with the actions of Eda Aydoğan, Güner Eke, İnönü Akgün Alp and Zehra Yılmaz, obtained strategic or state secret information and documents for espionage purposes under the guise of developing or establishing the software or systems of public institutions and organizations, and transferred them to the organization, "using the state's confidential information for the purpose of political or military espionage." It was emphasized that they committed the crime of "providing
INVESTIGATION
In the investigation carried out by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in line with the findings that individuals and companies affiliated with the secret structure of FETO/PDY were effective in the development and maintenance of MASAK's critical digital infrastructure between 2012 and 2018, 6 suspects who were detained were brought to the Istanbul Courthouse in Çağlayan.
The suspects who testified at the prosecutor's office, Eda Aydoğan, Güner Eke, İnönü Akgün Alp and Zehra Yılmaz, were referred to the criminal judgeship of peace with a request for arrest, and Zeki Özcan and Mehmet Yazıcı for judicial control.
On the other hand, it was learned that Mürsel Ali Kaplan, İbrahim Hakkı Polat and Osman Dereli, who served as MASAK President between 2012 and 2018, would testify.
