METU International Relations Department Lecturer Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever wrote about the possibility of a temporary and partial ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War, the issues that the parties can negotiate, and the factors that make the negotiation process difficult for AA Analysis.
As the war that started with Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 continues, efforts to achieve at least a temporary ceasefire, if a permanent ceasefire is not possible, continue. The fact that the Russia-Ukraine War lasted longer than the Second World War and became one of the most devastating wars on the European continent makes the risks posed by the war in terms of global security even more important. Although it is considered a remote possibility at this stage, the fact that the war has the potential to trigger the Third World War makes the establishment of a ceasefire, even if temporary, extremely important not only for the parties, but also for the international community as a whole.
Developments that increase expectations for a ceasefire
The most important development that recently increased the expectation of a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War was the visits of US President Donald Trump's special representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kiev, respectively. The parties paused comprehensive attacks during these periods, showing that they attach importance to the outcome of the US delegation's talks. After the visits, Russian officials stated in their statements that they were pleased to be in dialogue with the USA on ending the Ukrainian war, but that it was too early to negotiate a permanent ceasefire due to the attitudes of the countries in Europe.
Ukrainian officials, on the other hand, emphasized that there were no serious disagreements with the USA regarding the war and stated that Ukraine had strengthened its position as a result of these negotiations. Considering the statements made to the international public, it can be said that the talks of the US delegation, although not capable of providing a limited or comprehensive ceasefire, were a positive development in terms of confirming the existence of confidence-building measures and the openness of dialogue channels.
Likewise, another important development that strengthened the expectation of a ceasefire was President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy at the Turkevi in New York, where he was present for the 81st General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) on September 23, 2026. In this meeting, while Zelenskiy thanked Turkey for its support, he also underlined the importance of President Erdogan's mediation activities on peacefully ending the Russia-Ukraine War. Zelenski's point that Turkey is the most reliable country in the world in terms of mediation has been a development that strengthens the expectation of a ceasefire regarding the Russia-Ukraine War.
Both the meetings of the US delegation and Zelenskiy's emphasis on the importance of Turkey in the mediation process have strengthened the signals that it is possible to hold talks that meet the pragmatic short-term interests of the parties in tactical terms, if not a strategically sustainable permanent ceasefire.
Possible issues that the parties can discuss
Although it seems that Russia and Ukraine have shaped their military strategies according to the possibility of a long-term war, it is possible that the parties will negotiate on some issues. Among the possible negotiation topics, the parties' mutual exchange of dead, wounded and prisoners of war has a priority place.
The second possible negotiation issue may be for Russia and Ukraine to agree to refrain from targeting each other's energy facilities and infrastructures, especially as the developments in the Strait of Hormuz after the Israel/USA-Iran War increase energy prices. Although critical energy infrastructures have been targeted by the parties for a long time, the protection of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant from the effects of war has been one of the priorities of the international community due to its possible environmental and humanitarian consequences. Likewise, the decrease in the supply of diesel fuel and the increase in its prices due to the Russia-Ukraine War pose a great risk to global markets, causing the international community to expect the warring parties to avoid steps that will negatively affect global energy supply and prices. It seems very likely that the parties will hold direct or indirect negotiations on this issue.
Navigation and maritime security in the Black Sea stand out as the third possible negotiation issue that can be addressed between the parties. When the parties mutually attack ships carrying cargo, each country suffers from these conflicts. Russia and Ukraine, like all Black Sea littoral countries, have an interest in preventing attacks on merchant ships and ensuring the safety of navigation in the Black Sea.
In line with this common interest, it is important for the parties to conduct negotiations with the participation of the relevant regional countries, especially Türkiye, the implementer of the Montreux Treaty, in order to ensure navigation and maritime security in the Black Sea. Such a negotiation process could prevent the regional security situation, which has already reached a dangerous level, from spiraling further out of control.
Fourth and finally, Russia and Ukraine could renegotiate the facilitation of trade in grain and fertilizer, as they have previously done with the contributions of Türkiye and the UN. Although the previous process was partially successful, it became impracticable as a result of the parties turning to alternative trade corridors outside the Black Sea. However, considering the negativities caused by increasing food prices on a global scale, especially in Africa, Ukraine and Russia's delivery of this year's grain harvest and fertilizer production to international markets at lower costs may come to the agenda again as a negotiation issue from which both parties can gain economic gain.
Factors that make it difficult for the parties to sit at the negotiation table
Although it is possible for Russia and Ukraine to negotiate on some issues and develop temporary and partial ceasefire formulas through mediation, current military developments make it very difficult for the parties to even sit at the negotiation table. The most important factor that makes it difficult for Russia and Ukraine to sit at the negotiation table is the difficulty that the parties will have in getting their public opinion to accept their stance during the negotiation process.
The fact that both Russian and Ukrainian public opinion has been shaped by the conditions of war and mobilization for a long time may make it difficult for the public to accept the steps taken by the parties towards negotiation. This can make it particularly difficult to keep recruitment numbers at an adequate level and to maintain a high level of morale and motivation of soldiers in conflict zones.
The most important factor that reduces the possibility of the Ukrainian side participating in the negotiations is the effectiveness of "Operation Vivaldi", inspired by Vivaldi's "Four Seasons", in the Port region. Ukraine may not be very willing to negotiate because it assumes that it can achieve success in the field with this new war strategy, which includes the more effective use of artificial intelligence-based robotics and autonomous weapon systems. The confidence that this new war strategy can be effective in severe winter conditions also strengthens this attitude.
Another important factor that reduces the possibility of the Ukrainian side participating in the negotiations is the concern that the consensus on the current strategy among European countries, especially the powerful countries of Europe, may be weakened during the negotiation process.
The possibility of Russia reflecting its "divide and rule" strategy into the negotiation process through the rising far-right parties in Europe stands out as a serious risk factor. The most important factor that reduces the possibility of Russia participating in the negotiations is that Moscow thinks that military methods will yield more effective results than diplomatic negotiations under current conditions.
Moscow feels diplomatically strong in the international arena due to its ability to establish close relations with both the USA and China in certain crises, and it thinks that it can maintain its capacity to use military force in Ukraine in the near future. Moscow also assumes that Ukraine and European countries will not be able to change the current situation on the front lines in the near future. Russia's statements that it is ready to escalate the war by using threatening language against European countries also stand out as another important factor that makes it difficult for Moscow to sit at the negotiation table.
Although a permanent ceasefire in the Ukrainian War does not seem possible in the near future, it is not entirely impossible for the parties to negotiate limited partial ceasefires on issues such as prisoner exchange, energy, grain and navigation and maritime security in the Black Sea, although it is difficult due to the factors mentioned above.
