Security deficiencies at the Cispa center: leakage of knowledge was possible

The finding is devastating. At the Helmholtz Center for Information Security Cispa, of all places, the precautions against the outflow of sensitive knowledge were apparently so inadequate that Research Minister Dorothee Bär spoke of “doors and gates” that were wide open.

A special auditor was unable to determine whether security-relevant information was actually leaked. What is certain, however, is that such an outflow would have been technically possible because the existing regulations and systems were not suitable to prevent it.

The events at Cispa are also bringing other German scientific institutions into focus. They raise a fundamental question: How effectively do universities and research institutes protect sensitive knowledge from access by foreign actors? This needs to be checked thoroughly now at the latest.

Doing nothing would be highly negligent. According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, China has “for years been operating a comprehensive system of technology and know-how transfer, which is at the center of Chinese scientific espionage in order to advance its economic and military development.”

Germany's universities and research centers have a wealth of knowledge in this regard: from artificial intelligence to quantum computers to state-of-the-art cybersecurity, the digital future is being played a key role here. Much of it is basic research and can be used commercially. So-called “dual-use” technologies can also serve military purposes.