The midterm elections, which will determine the political balances in the remaining two years of President Donald Trump's term in the United States, have created a picture that may have important consequences not only in terms of the country's domestic politics, but also in terms of the balance of power in the Middle East.
The fact that the Democrats gained the majority in both houses of Congress is considered a development that may increase the political and institutional pressure on the Trump administration, especially its Iran policy.
The economic consequences of the war with Iran, rising energy prices and dissatisfaction among the American public were among the problems faced by Republicans during the election period. As a matter of fact, Trump acknowledged in his statement to the Wall Street Journal after the election results that the war in Iran was effective in the Republicans' losses.
However, Trump stated that he did not regret his decision to start the war and said that he would make the same decision again under the same conditions. In fact, he also signaled that election defeat would not mean a step back in Iran policy.
However, the majority in Congress passing to the Democrats may strengthen the political and institutional control mechanisms in front of Trump. In particular, the cost of the war, military expenditures, and the administration's decisions regarding Iran policy can be discussed more intensively in Congress. However, the broad powers that the US president has regarding foreign policy and military operations do not mean that the Democrats' victory will automatically prevent a new attack.
So, could Trump, who has lost both houses of Congress, turn more to the military option against Iran in order to re-establish his political authority and maintain his image as a strong leader?
"Let's look at the calendar first. According to AP's projections, the Democrats won both houses. But the new Congress will take office only on January 3. So, for the next two months, Trump will still work with a Republican Congress. I think the most sensitive period is exactly this window," said one of the researchers of the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM).
According to evaluations reflected in the US press, after the midterm elections, Trump's power in domestic politics will decrease and his attention will shift to foreign policy and the legacy he will leave. After January, the picture changes. Democrats can use their budget authority and move the debate on Congressional approval under the War Powers Act to the center of the agenda. The cost of the war has already exceeded $47 billion, the Pentagon reported to Congress. This is strong ground for questioning spending. So, will Trump turn to the military option for his strong leader image? There is a counter to this logic, but there is also a strong argument in the opposite direction. The election result is largely read as a reaction to the war and the high cost of living. In this scenario, escalating the war would go against the voters' message.
Signals over the last 48 hours have also been mixed. The United States launched a limited attack on a newly built air defense facility on Qeshm Island on election morning. Trump called it a minor attack. On the same day, he told the Financial Times that there was no plan to strike Iran in the near term, that they were taking everything they wanted. Vice President JD Vance also stated that they are optimistic about a deal. However, on the other hand, shipments to the region have accelerated. So there is military activity. There are two paths before Trump: Either a short and intense campaign or an agreement from Doha. Both can produce a narrative of victory. For Trump, the main thing is not to look strong, but to look winning. If he can get this on the table, he won't need the military option. However, I still can't say I'm hopeful.
It is also followed closely by Israel. The weakening of the Trump administration's political support in Congress may open the door to a new era in Israel's relations with Washington. Especially regarding Iran, how the military and diplomatic coordination between the USA and Israel will be shaped becomes of great importance.
On the other hand, the political uncertainty facing Netanyahu in Israel is among the factors that may affect Tehran's policy. Netanyahu's difficulty in maintaining his power or the emergence of a new political equation may change the timing and method of Israel's steps towards Iran. However, it is also noted that the approach that sees Iran as a security threat for Israel is not limited to the Netanyahu administration.
"For Israel, two separate weakenings are happening at the same time," said Oral Toğa, "The first is the ground in Washington. A Democratic Congress will be much more questioning about military aid and arms sales to Israel, because Congress allocates the aid money. It is also known that criticism of Israel among the Democratic base has increased significantly in recent years."
"The interesting thing is that Trump himself increased the uncertainty. On the morning of the election, he announced that the annual military aid to Israel, worth approximately $4 billion, would end at the end of the year, and said that this was an agreement they reached with Netanyahu. He also clearly stated that he did this to take an argument away from the Democrats. However, the current aid agreement is valid until 2028, and the statement caught Israeli officials off guard."
"Secondly, Israel's domestic politics. Netanyahu's bloc could not win the majority in the October 27 elections, but Netanyahu remains in office until the new government is formed. This leaves Israel with an interim government at a critical period," said Oral Toğa, and gave the following answer to my question about how this situation will affect Iran policy:
It affects the means and timing, not the goals. Both Eisenkot and Bennett are as tough on Iran as Netanyahu. But the possibility of weakening support in Washington sends the following message to Israel: The window of access to the US's military capacity is narrowing. This could increase pressure for a joint operation in the short term. As a matter of fact, there are reports that Netanyahu is pushing for an attack right after the midterm elections, while Trump wants to give negotiations a chance. Israel denies this. In the long run, the situation is different. For deep targets such as Mount Kazma, US participation is decisive. As the restraining role of Congress increases, what Israel can do on its own against Iran will be limited.
Netanyahu and the team around him are still in the mistake of thinking that the blind-eye propaganda techniques of the 19th and 20th centuries will work. It's true that social media and smartphones provide a huge amount of data. It is a fact that some companies are trying to monopolize this flow, just like in the past. However, it is still not possible to retain a single channel as in conventional media. The model of 'people who became famous overnight and whose lives ended overnight' ended in the 1990s. Now everyone is watching the genocide and what was done in HD quality while lying at home. Therefore, it makes no sense to target names like Hasan Piker from the podium.
Iran, another important actor of the developments in the region, is trying to increase its military deterrence regardless of the political changes in the USA and Israel. The fact that Tehran is preparing for a possible new conflict while maintaining diplomatic contacts indicates that the country is following a two-pronged strategy.
The New York Times report on the subject also states that the Iranian administration is considering the possibility of a new conflict, but has not completely closed diplomatic channels. For Iran, negotiations are a tool not only to prevent war, but also to gain bargaining power on topics such as lifting sanctions, releasing frozen assets and preserving influence on the Strait of Hormuz.
The main disagreements between Washington and Tehran are Iran's nuclear program, sanctions and the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The United States' demands regarding Iran's nuclear activities and Tehran's request for the lifting of sanctions before negotiations make it difficult to establish a basis for compromise. Therefore, the continuation of diplomatic contacts does not mean that the military tension in the field has ended.
Underlining that Iran's attitude is not a dilemma but a conscious two-track strategy, Oral Toğa said, "Tehran's basic assumption is that the Iranian administration does not think that the war is over, but continues. It considers the US blockade and airspace restrictions as a continuation of the war. Therefore, it does not attach great meaning to the election results in the USA or Israel. The message shared by the Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Parliament, Ibrahim Azizi, in Hebrew before the Israeli elections is the clearest example of this. He wrote that they do not doubt their hostility, regardless of the election result. "There is not much difference in terms of war between Netanyahu and Eisenkot in Tehran," he said.
Stating that two lines emerge from this assumption, Toga said, "The first is deterrence. Guide Mojtaba Khamenei instructed the armed forces to respond without geographical boundaries and asked for the expansion of the target list last Saturday. It is also known that missile production has partially restarted. The second is diplomacy. Iranian negotiators met with Qatari and Pakistani mediators in Doha for three days. Message traffic continues through a draft text. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi also says that they are ready for both defense and diplomacy at the same time. These two do not contradict each other. "Tehran sees deterrence as a precondition for negotiations and thinks that a weak Iran will lose at the table," he said.
