Sanmao: The CCP’s gray zone strategy upgrades, and the coast guard is deployed in eastern Taiwan on a regular basis

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party’s pressure on Taiwan has gradually extended from military aircraft and warships to coast guard and scientific research ships; the latest analysis by the Institute of War Studies (ISW) of the United States pointed out that since June 2026, the China Coast Guard has continued to conduct long-term "law enforcement patrols" in the waters east of Taiwan in two-ship formations, and has been regularly replaced by new formations, forming a similar rotation. This is obviously different from the sporadic and short-term coast guard operations in the past, and shows that Beijing is gradually pushing the coast guard force to the east of Taiwan to establish a sustained presence. ISW believes that this type of deployment is likely not just for maritime law enforcement, but an attempt to gradually make "the Chinese coast guard has the right to enforce law here" into a reality that the international community is accustomed to.

Chinese Coast Guard ships have continued to operate in the waters east of Taiwan since June this year, with a patrol area of ​​27,100 square nautical miles. In recent years, China has continued to increase coast guard activities in the waters around Kinmen, Dongsha and Taiwan, and has packaged its actions through "law enforcement inspections". ISW pointed out that in August, China's coast guard continued to enter waters under Taiwan's jurisdiction around Kinmen and Dongsha, reflecting that Beijing is using the coast guard as an important tool to weaken the actual management and control capabilities of Taiwan's waters.

What is even more noteworthy is that the sea area east of Taiwan where the CCP originally maintained less fixed coast guard presence is now seeing continuous deployment. This means that Beijing may be establishing a gray zone structure of "simultaneous pressure from the east and west sides": on the west side, it uses outer islands such as Kinmen to test Taiwan's law enforcement response, while on the east side, it gradually shapes new maritime facts through the long-term presence of the coast guard. The real danger is not that a single ship crosses the border, but that these individual actions may form a new "fait accompli" over many years.

This time, the activities of the Chinese scientific research ship "Xiangyanghong 03" cannot be ignored. ISW pointed out that the ship conducted surveys in the waters east of Taiwan from August 10 to 31 and was accompanied by a Chinese coast guard ship. China's Ministry of Natural Resources claimed that the relevant surveys were for natural resource management and maritime area governance, but Chinese official media quoted Chinese experts as saying that the relevant actions also had certain "diplomatic and military significance." ISW further assessed that the detailed information obtained from these marine surveys may support the development of the People's Liberation Army's underwater combat capabilities, including submarine and anti-submarine warfare, and increase its ability to conduct military operations in the waters east of Taiwan.

This also reveals a feature of the CCP’s gray zone strategy: coast guard, scientific research, militia and military forces can cooperate with each other. A single action may seem to be a civilian activity, but after repeated overlays, it may be transformed into military preparations. For Taiwan, what really needs to be vigilant is this mixed model of "civilian name + military effectiveness."

The core judgment of the ISW deserves great attention: the Chinese Coast Guard continues to appear in eastern Taiwan, and one of the purposes may be to gradually strengthen Beijing’s jurisdictional claims over Taiwan and its surrounding waters; the ISW even warned that if merchant ships gradually accept and comply with the “law enforcement” instructions issued by the China Coast Guard, Beijing may be more likely to implement quarantines or blockades in a short period of time in the future.

Therefore, this is not a simple coast guard patrol issue, but a "rules shaping" issue; Beijing does not necessarily need to announce a blockade immediately. As long as international shipping companies get used to "China Coast Guard will enforce the law here," over time, China's unilateral claims may be transformed into actual rules of conduct. This is the key point that Taiwan needs to explain to the international community: What is really being eroded is Taiwan's actual control of its surrounding waters, as well as regional navigation freedom and existing maritime order.

Faced with the regular eastward movement of the Chinese Coast Guard, Taiwan cannot just announce eviction or surveillance information after each incident, but should establish a long-term, institutionalized countermeasure. First, the Coast Guard should continue to strengthen maritime surveillance, ship identification and evidence collection capabilities, and fully record the activities of the Chinese Coast Guard, scientific research vessels and possible accompanying maritime militia; secondly, the government Relevant track and incident information should continue to be provided to the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and European partners, so that the international community can understand that this is not a single law enforcement incident, but a cumulative action by China to gradually change the status quo of maritime areas; Taiwan should also strengthen maritime security cooperation with neighboring countries, especially in the areas of intelligence sharing, maritime law and order, and the establishment of common standards for handling gray areas.

More importantly, Taiwan should clearly convey to the international community that if China gradually establishes a "normal law enforcement zone" east of Taiwan in the name of coast guard, it may actually be creating conditions for future isolation, blockade, or even military operations. In the face of such advancement, the international community cannot wait until the blockade actually begins before reacting.

The real warning revealed by the latest ISW report is that China's pressure on Taiwan is shifting from an "incident-type" to a "normal" type; when the Coast Guard has fixed rotations, repeated investigations by scientific research ships, and civilian activities and military effects are combined, Beijing may gradually establish a new maritime reality. Therefore, what Taiwan faces is not a single cruise, but a long-term competition regarding maritime jurisdiction, international rules and regional order.

In addition to its own maritime patrol and national defense capabilities, Taiwan must further internationalize and make China's gray zone operations more transparent, allowing democratic countries and the global shipping community to understand its risks. Only by establishing a common warning and countermeasures mechanism as early as possible before China has turned "normalized law enforcement" into a fait accompli can we avoid Taiwan's surrounding waters being rewritten step by step in silence.