◎ Yang Congrong
On September 29, the Legislative Yuan voted on 27 nominees for the Control Yuan, but in the end all of them were rejected. The term of the 6th Supervisory Committee expired at the end of July, and the 7th Supervisory Committee has not yet been elected. On the surface, this personnel case is a political struggle between the presidential nomination power and the legislative consent power. The real issue worthy of discussion goes beyond whether the 27 nominees are qualified for office. It is how Taiwan can maintain government accountability, human rights protection, and power checks and balances when there is no supervisory committee as the Inspector General.
There is a gap in the oversight function of constitutional design
On September 29, the Legislative Yuan voted on 27 nominees for the Control Yuan, but in the end all of them were rejected. (File photo) According to the current constitutional system, the Legislative Yuan certainly has the right to veto candidates proposed by the president. If the right of consent can only be used to agree but not to veto, it will lose its institutional significance. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 632 of 2007 has pointed out that when the Legislative Yuan votes on the personnel case of the Supervisory Committee, whether the result is agreement or disagreement, it is an exercise of the right of consent. From this perspective, the rejection of all 27 people is not in itself a failure of the constitutional process, but a possible political result under the authority of the constitution.
The real problem lies in the next step. After the seventh Supervisory Committee failed to be elected, although the administrative system of the Supervisory Yuan still exists, people's complaints can still be accepted, and civil servants can still handle administrative affairs. However, the core functions of impeachment, correction, and prosecution that require the Supervisory Committee to make decisions have been substantially affected, and the operation of the National Human Rights Commission is also facing problems. The system has not completely stopped, but there are gaps in some of the supervisory functions required by the constitutional design.
Taiwan has actually already had similar experiences. During Chen Shui-bian's administration, the Control Yuan had no supervisory committee members for more than three years. At that time, state administration was not paralyzed, and people's lives did not immediately undergo dramatic changes because the Control Yuan suspended its core functions. This experience cannot be used to prove that supervisory power is unnecessary. Instead, it raises a more fundamental question: What Taiwan really needs to maintain is the "Supervisory Yuan", a constitutional organization, or the indispensable public functions of impeachment, correction, auditing, human rights protection, and integrity supervision.
This distinction is very important. When discussing the existence or abolition of the Control Yuan, if we only stop at supporting the five-power constitution or advocating the replacement of five chambers with three chambers, it is easy to fall back into the position of political parties. What really needs to be addressed in institutional reform is functional configuration. Even if the Supervisory Yuan is abolished in the future by amending the constitution, government officials will still need to be investigated and held accountable for their violations of laws and dereliction of duty. The central government’s budget and final accounts will still need to be independently audited. The National Human Rights Commission will still need to maintain institutional independence. Political donations, conflicts of interest, and other integrity supervision must not have loopholes.
In other words, abolishing an institution does not mean abolishing a state function. The real difficulty is rearranging power.
The current political situation instead provides an opportunity for renewed discussion. The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated the abolition of the Examination Yuan and the Supervisory Yuan. Before the completion of the constitutional amendment, the rulers must still propose candidates for the Supervisory Committee in accordance with the current constitution. The Kuomintang has a historical tradition of upholding the five-power constitution, and in recent years there have been calls within the party to abolish the Supervisory Yuan. The originally clear boundaries between different political parties' positions are gradually loosening, which does not necessarily mean that a consensus on constitutional amendment has been formed. At least it means that the existence or abolition of the Control Yuan is no longer completely equivalent to the opposition between blue and green.
System reform can be divided into two levels. The vacuum of supervisory power must be resolved in the short term. Interpretation No. 632 has left institutional space. When the term of the Supervisory Committee expires and a new candidate has not yet been elected, legislators can establish an appropriate transition mechanism through law. There is no reason for the executive and legislative branches to prolong the personnel deadlock indefinitely and let the system costs be borne by the people.
In the long term, the discussion on the existence and abolition of the Control Yuan should be formally brought back to the constitutional amendment level. The question cannot just be "Do we need a Control Yuan?" but we should take stock of the existing powers item by item. If the Oversight Yuan is abolished, which agency will take over the impeachment power, whether the audit power needs to establish a more highly independent audit system, whether the National Human Rights Commission should adopt an independent agency model or other constitutional arrangements, and how to reconfigure government integrity, conflicts of interest, and political donation supervision need to be clearly designed in advance.
Constitutional government exam questions after all 27 people were rejected
This is also the most noteworthy institutional significance of the rejection of all 27 supervisory committee nominees this time. The personnel case can be seen as a party attack and defense, and it can also be an opportunity to re-examine the five-power constitutional structure. If political discussions only stop at who to nominate, who to block, and who should be responsible, and another group of candidates is proposed a few months later, Taiwan may still return to the same deadlock.
What a mature democratic system really pursues is not to keep every constitutional organ in its original form forever, but to ensure that every necessary public power has clear responsibilities, full democratic legitimacy, and effective checks and balances. The Supervisory Yuan can discuss whether to maintain or abolish the system, but the supervisory power cannot leave a vacuum. The rejection of all 27 people only closed the door to this round of personnel appointments. What should really be opened is the constitutional discussion on how to redesign the supervision system in Taiwan.
When discussing the existence or abolition of the Control Yuan, if we only stop at supporting the five-power constitution or advocating the replacement of five chambers with three chambers, it is easy to fall back into the position of political parties. (File photo)
