◎ Hong Yurui
Japan's cross-party parliamentarians recently went to Beijing to try to repair Japan-China relations that had deteriorated due to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's previous remarks that an attack on Taiwan could constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan. At almost the same time, the United States scaled back some of its joint military exercises with South Korea, while South Korea continued to repair relations with China. Putting these things together, Taiwan should probably ask: Where does Taiwan rank in the eyes of Japan and South Korea?
Japan pays close attention to the Taiwan Strait, first of all, not because of "support for Taiwan", but because if a major crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, it is likely to directly affect Japan's own security. The "existential crisis" mentioned by Takaichi Sanae itself is based on Japan's national security and legal framework. Japan's sending of congressmen to Beijing today to mend relations also shows that diplomacy does not have only one path.
Japan's cross-party parliamentarians recently went to Beijing to try to repair Japan-China relations that had deteriorated due to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's previous remarks that an attack on Taiwan could constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan. (Bloomberg file photo) Therefore, Taiwan may have heard one thing wrong all along: Japan's talk of "something happening in Taiwan" does not mean Japan's promise that "if something happens in Taiwan, Japan will definitely take action." What Japan really calculates is what kind of Taiwan Strait crisis will endanger Japan and force Japan to take action.
South Korea is another mirror.
On the one hand, the Lee Jae-myung government emphasizes the U.S.-South Korea alliance and its own defense capabilities, and on the other hand, it also actively repairs relations between South Korea and China. Wang Yi recently visited Seoul and publicly asked South Korea not to choose sides in the strategic competition between China and the United States. South Korea and China are also seeking to resume more high-level exchanges. On the other hand, the United States has scaled back some military exercises, leaving Seoul to face the complex calculation between North Korea's security and U.S. commitments.
Of course, South Korea has its own problems with North Korea, and it also has huge economic and trade interests with China. It is not difficult to understand that it is trying to gain space among major powers. But if South Korea only regards the Taiwan Strait as part of the competition between the United States and China, it may underestimate Taiwan's importance to South Korea itself.
Once a major crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, it may affect not only Taiwan and China, but also the U.S.-South Korea alliance, the deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea, North Korea's strategic judgment, and the shipping and semiconductor supply chains on which South Korea is highly dependent. The recent adjustment of the United States' security commitments to Asia has reminded South Korea that the Taiwan Strait issue will hardly always be "someone else's problem."
Of course, the "big things" in North Korea's history cannot be directly applied to today's South Korea. However, for a country that has been caught between major powers for a long time, it is still worthy of South Korea's consideration whether it should first watch what the major powers do before deciding on its own course, or whether it should first consider its own national interests before deciding who to cooperate with.
Same goes for Taiwan. International politics is not a vote of friends, but a calculation of national interests.
What Taiwan really deserves to fight for is not for others to support Taiwan out of sympathy, but for peace across the Taiwan Strait to become a self-interest that Japan, South Korea and even more countries cannot ignore.
