Preliminary Report of Ship Accident in the Sea of Marmara Revealed

A comprehensive investigation into the Tuğberk İmamoğlu cargo ship, which sank in the Sea of ​​Marmara with its crew of 10, continues. The preliminary determination report prepared upon the request of the prosecutor's office explains to a large extent how the disaster occurred. The conclusion of the expert preliminary determination report dated September 3, 2026 is as follows;

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF SHIP ACCIDENT IN MARMARA

“As a result of the conflict (marine accident) that occurred on the Marmara Sea Traffic Separation Strip at around 03:13 on 02 September 2026, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship sank rapidly, taking damage from the pier side; there is still no news from its crew.

In the preliminary examination carried out within the framework of the limited ECDIS playback data of the M/T ALSU ship, the log records at the time of the incident, the statements of the seafarers and the ship's Bridge Management Manual (BMM) rules; It has been determined that the accident occurred due to both the bridge navigation safety organization violations detected on M/T ALSU (Watch Condition B violation, leaving a single and inexperienced officer, lack of a lookout) and the severe bilateral loss of situational awareness as a result of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship's AIS device being turned off/defective/or not working adequately as a result of external intervention, and performing dangerous starboard turn maneuvers contrary to the radio agreement currently available.”

This report, prepared immediately after the accident, points out personnel errors as well as a major deficiency in terms of the technical equipment that ships must have for navigation. According to the report, the disaster occurred due to the succession of many negative factors, human errors as well as lack of electronic equipment made the accident almost inevitable.

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One of the conclusions from the report is that the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship does not send AIS data. Within the scope of Turkish maritime regulations, all ships over a certain size are required to have this device, which works as an automatic identification system. This device simply reports the ship's speed, route and identity information to surrounding ships via radio waves. Since the İmamoğlu ship did not send this data, it may have become invisible and unrecognizable to surrounding ships.

In the preliminary report of the expert panel, the status of this device was described as “Closed, malfunctioning, or unable to function adequately due to external interference.” It is impossible not to have this system on a ship like Tuğberk İmamoğlu, and the report indicates that the device is dysfunctional for different reasons.

IT SEEN JUST AS A TRACE ON THE RADAR

How did the problem caused by the device manifest itself during the accident? According to the report, the accident occurred on September 2, 2026 at 03.13. Shortly before the accident, at around 03.08, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship was not sending AIS data.

In the "Detection and Invisibility" heading of the report, which examines the situation of the ships at 03.06, it says: "At a distance of 1.8 miles, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship appears on ALSU's ECDIS screen as a target moving at a speed of 7.2 knots, only as a radar echo ('Missing Echo'). The fact that the AIS does not send data has made identification and early passage planning impossible."

HE DID NOT PROVIDE SPEED, IDENTITY AND ROUTE INFORMATION

This statement may also mean that the Alsou ship that collided with Tuğberk İmamoğlu could see the other ship in terms of navigation devices, but did not have information such as identity and speed route. According to the navigation rules at sea, ships take precautions against ships they may collide with by looking at their speed and route information, increasing their speed, changing their routes or slowing down. According to the report, Tuğberk İmamoğlu appeared only as a trace on Alsu's radars because AIS did not send the data.

The report also included information that a connection was established between the ships via radio, but there were problems with the navigation systems at this time. 4 minutes before the accident, ALSU's 2nd Officer Murat Evciman was contacted via radio with Tuğberk İmamoğlu. Tuğberk İmamoğlu called the ship captain Alsou on the radio and asked him to maneuver. The Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship could see the data Alsu sent, even though it did not send any data itself.

While Evciman's information and claim were transferred to the report, "It is stated that ALSU started to change its route towards the pier upon the other party's request to 'run to the pier'." It was said. According to Evciman's claim, Alsu fully realized the existence of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship after this connection. It is also noteworthy that Tuğberk İmamoğlu, whose AIS system was not working, noticed Alsu at midnight and asked him to maneuver.

THE SECOND ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WAS WORKING WITH PROBLEMS

Ships use a system known as ECDIS, Electronic Chart Display and Information System, instead of charts. According to the expert's preliminary detection report, there was also a problem in the operation of this system. When the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship contacted Alsu, shortly before the accident, it was already visible as a trace on the radar. The report included the information that there was also a problem with a second navigation system, after the radio contact, Alsu started to turn its course to its left upon this request, and while Alsu was changing its course, Tuğberk İmamoğlu disappeared from the ECDIS system. Tuğberk İmamoğlu suddenly reappeared in this system and, according to the report, started to turn to the starboard, that is, to his right, contrary to the meeting they had with Alsu. Meanwhile, Tuğberk İmamoğlu's ship reduced its speed to 5;8 knots, while Alsou continued on its way a little faster at 7 knots.

HUMAN ERROR, LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND DEVICE FAILURES

According to the expert report, not Alsu, but the other ship, Tuğberk İmamoğlu, hit Alsu in the starboard bow and shoulder.

The expert committee noted in its report that the reason why the ship sank after this drift should be examined separately and the loading status should be examined. The preliminary report is also being examined by the prosecutor's office. Dozens of issues will need to be examined, such as the load status of the ships, whether the loads are placed incorrectly, who carried out the seaworthiness tests of the ships, and whether the calibration and settings of the navigational electronics are complete.