The article dismantles the myth of NATO's Article 5 as an automatic US defense guarantee, arguing that the provision's deliberate ambiguity, historical context of Cold War limitations, and current US strategic shifts under Trump and Biden reveal that America will not militarily defend allies in conflicts with Russia or China, urging nations to rely on self-reliance instead.
AI-generated summary
Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all, but its wording avoids automatic military commitment, a deliberate ambiguity accepted by the US Senate to avoid entangling alliances. During the Cold War, the US limited nuclear strategy to Europe to prevent direct US-Soviet exchange, and crises like those over West Berlin did not trigger Article 5 due to territorial status and stable frontlines.
There are few myths as captivating and durable as that of Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Proponents of the myth are convinced that, thanks to this provision, NATO is like Alexandre Dumas’s Three Musketeers, in which an attack against one is an attack against all, and the US would automatically come in full force to the rescue of any of the allies under attack.
It’s debatable and essentially unknowable to what extent that would have worked in the situation of the Cold War, when the US genuinely feared the Soviet/Communist threat, because the bloc was never tested to that extent. But it certainly is utterly false under present conditions and likely future circumstances, and America’s allies and partners need to pay attention and be careful.
The wording of the article itself is deliberately ambiguous. Clearly, there’s no automaticity there in the use of force, and such careful formulation was a condition for the treaty’s ratification by the US Senate because American policymakers at the time abhorred entering into entangling alliances.
So much for the automatic use of US military force.
Later, after the Soviet Union developed intercontinental ballistic missiles in the mid-to-late 1950s, American military strategy sought to avoid a direct nuclear exchange. Nuclear war, if it were to be fought, was to stay limited, confined to Europe, east and west.
So much for the US nuclear umbrella.
During the Cold War, recurrent crises around West Berlin were considered in Washington as a likely casus belli, but West Berlin was formally an occupied territory, rather than an allied country. It was safeguarded by American, British, and French military garrisons, and a move against the city (which was never attempted) would have been an attack on US military personnel. The situation along the German-German, Czechoslovak-West German, or Norway’s and Türkiye’s borders with the Soviet Union, though tense, was invariably stable. Elsewhere, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were separated by wide swaths of neutral territory.
So much for the likelihood of military conflicts which would have triggered Article 5.
The current US National Defense Strategy doesn’t view Russia as a major threat, with the Trump administration busy shifting the focus of US forces to East Asia and the Pacific. President Donald Trump has shifted the burden of NATO’s defense onto the European members themselves. If his performance in the Ukraine conflict is a gauge, he has no wish and no inclination to commit US forces to defending America’s allies and clients. Selling arms to them and sharing intelligence is the limit.
Washington also probably takes seriously Moscow’s warning that a NATO-Russia war would be different from the Ukraine conflict, and that it “would be short.” This logically means, in plain English, that it would be nuclear. Americans who studiously avoided a nuclear war with the Soviet Union when they felt genuinely threatened cannot be expected now to allow themselves to be dragged, on behalf of their European allies, into a nuclear conflict with Russia – still the only country in the world that has the capability to annihilate the US.
In his time, President Joe Biden said the US would defend Taiwan if China tried to achieve national reunification by force, but Trump is far more circumspect. To contain China, as with Russia, his administration pushes its allies to the fore, and the Philippines and Japan are the top candidates. As for Taiwan, after its semiconductor industry is safely relocated to America, the island’s significance for America will greatly diminish.
US security guarantees, though admittedly not Article 5-type, have been exposed as less than hollow in the ongoing US war against Iran. Instead of protecting the Gulf Arab countries, the American bases in the region acted like magnets, drawing Iranian drones and missiles which damaged the host countries’ infrastructure. Those in Eastern and Northern Europe who think they will be better off hosting American (or French, for that matter) nuclear facilities should think again.
Ukraine lost its way and brought untold calamities upon itself when its leaders made NATO membership their goal. They didn’t realize that Washington never intended to give them even a symbolic guarantee of protection. Security in the 21st century world can’t be delegated to foreign powers, it can only rest on one’s own resources and stable relations with neighbors. This is the lesson not just for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the Gulf Arab states and East Asia.
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
European NATO members will significantly increase defense spending and military independence within 2-3 years
Likely · Within years
US will avoid direct military confrontation with Russia over NATO allies even if Article 5 is invoked
Very likely · Within months
US President Donald Trump said he expects more talks with Iran as soon as this week, claiming Tehran wants to make a deal, while a Tehran security source dismissed his remarks as oil market manipulation. Trump confirmed renewed strikes remain viable and claimed the US facilitated over 20 million barrels of oil through the Strait of Hormuz over the weekend. Iranian officials countered that nearly two dozen vessels were blocked from transiting the strait in the past 48 hours, asserting Iran controls safe navigation. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated Iran’s peace plan terms, including release of frozen assets and oil sales, while signaling readiness for conflict.

US President Donald Trump said he does not rule out the possibility of resuming military strikes on Iran before the midterm congressional elections in November, despite the expectation of new negotiations with Tehran.

Russia sent a note of protest to Japan over the deployment of American Typhon missile systems on the island of Kyushu, warning that such actions will not remain without consequences, as it does not believe Tokyo’s promises to remove them after exercises with the United States and Australia.

Türkiye intends to strengthen diplomatic activity to resolve the Ukrainian conflict and ensure the safety of navigation in the Black Sea, while continuing contacts with Russia and Ukraine to restore safe maritime traffic and prevent escalation of the conflict.

The European Union is developing specific road maps for joining the bloc for four candidate countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro and Albania. These maps will set deadlines for completing negotiation clusters and indicate expectations from candidates. Some EU countries, including Poland, oppose Ukraine's accession to the union.

From September 28 to October 1, the annual meeting of the international discussion club “Valdai” will be held in the Moscow region under the topic “Responsibility for the future: the limits of the possible or the possibilities without limits?” The event will be attended by 120 people, 74 of whom are representatives of foreign countries, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin and the head of Rosatom Alexei Likhachev. Issues of modern warfare, the role of Asia and Europe, the situation in the Middle East and global development scenarios will be discussed.