A drone circles over a safety-relevant factory site in Bremen. The operator recognizes the aircraft, even the presumed location of the pilot. But he is not allowed to intervene. By the time the police arrive, the drone is gone.
For the authors of a new security study, this example is symptomatic of a larger problem: Germany's greatest weakness is not a lack of technology or knowledge, but the transitions in between. Bernhard Steimel, head of the study, says: “Existing capabilities must be combined in such a way that situational information leads to decisions and decisions have a timely effect.”
The study by the Bonn security network AFCEA comes to a sobering conclusion: Germany is more than ten years behind in establishing a national security ecosystem in important areas. Information, responsibilities and resources often did not mesh quickly enough. Time is lost between warning, decision and implementation, a “chaining gap”.
“Germany only has limited ability to act”
Those surveyed in the study see clear deficits. These are responsible people from the Bundeswehr, politics, the arms industry or operators from critical infrastructure. 61 percent consider Germany to have limited ability to act in complex crisis situations, and another 15 percent even believe that it is unable to act. Nobody assesses the country as fully capable of acting.
The study is based on 55 in-depth interviews with 61 interviewees, an online survey of 72 experts and a comparison of international approaches.
“No cross-departmental situation report”
For Major General Armin Fleischmann, Chairman of AFCEA Bonn, a core problem lies in the cooperation between authorities and organizations. "To this day, there is no cross-departmental situation report. Joint structures such as the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center were created laboriously and mostly as a reaction to specific events," says Armin Fleischmann.
The major general formulates the structural deficits even more clearly: "Responsible bodies are not technically interoperable. Legal barriers take effect. Organizations work in silos. Trust and incentives to exchange information are missing." Existing skills are generally available, but are too rarely connected across organizational boundaries.
Drones, cyberattacks and power outages
This becomes particularly visible in the case of threats that affect several responsibilities at the same time. Drones change areas of responsibility, power outages affect communication and supply at the same time, and in hybrid attacks the cause often remains unclear at first. A single situation can quickly turn into an interdepartmental crisis.
The study cites attacks on wind turbines in Poland as another example. A German energy operator initially received relevant information from Dutch authorities. German authorities only passed on the information two weeks later.
Warnings should lead to decisions more quickly
Study leader Bernhard Steimel is therefore primarily calling for better connections between existing structures. "Limited ability to act is not a condition that can be endured. Anyone who first clarifies the situation and who decides has already lost the situation." That's why "binding mandates, reliable handovers and a practice that is practiced before the crisis" are needed.
The study does not suggest a central federal crisis team. Instead, different situation reports from the fire brigade, police, military or infrastructure operators should be better linked. Decisions should be able to be made where those responsible have to act.
Neubaur: “Security is a task for society as a whole”
Support comes from North Rhine-Westphalia's Economics Minister Mona Neubaur (Alliance 90/The Greens). She speaks of a changed geopolitical situation, of hybrid threats and cyber attacks that present new challenges to the state, economy and society. “Security cannot be guaranteed solely militarily or within individual jurisdictions, but must be designed as a task for society as a whole,” says Neubaur.
In their opinion, a resilient security ecosystem includes secure networks, a reliable energy supply, resilient supply chains and capable companies. "A resilient security ecosystem thrives on the fact that different competencies intertwine effectively. It is therefore important to link existing skills more closely and to further develop proven structures together," said the Minister of Economic Affairs of North Rhine-Westphalia.
30 measures to combat the “ten-year gap”
In total, the study formulates 30 concrete measures. They range from shared situation reports to standardized data connections between military and civilian authorities to crisis exercises for political decision-makers. Hospitals, operators of critical infrastructure and volunteers should also be more closely involved.
For study director Steimel, the starting situation is not hopeless despite the deficits: "Germany has the means, the skills and the people to be able to act in crises and security situations in 2030. However, the chain of action between authorities, levels and systems regularly breaks - before, during and after such situations." Closing this chain is the central goal of the study.
