(Deutsche Welle Chinese website) China's newly revised "National Defense Mobilization Law" will take effect on October 1, which is the first major revision of the law in 16 years. Some political scientists told DW that the newly revised provisions present the concept of "general mobilization" to transform China's economic and social strength into national defense strength.
Analysis points out that the scale of war prepared by this system exceeds the Taiwan Strait conflict itself. It also draws on the experience of the Russia-Ukraine war. China is building the ability to support large-scale wars and long-term attrition.
Other scholars believe that even in peacetime, the mobilization system can be used in Sino-US competition to enhance overall national strength and national security by mobilizing different social and economic resources.
What new amendments have been added to the legislation?
China's old version of the "National Defense Mobilization Law" came into effect in 2010. On August 28 this year, the National People's Congress Standing Committee voted to pass the newly revised "National Defense Mobilization Law", with the articles increased from 72 to 82.
Comparing the old and new versions, the law has the biggest change in the general provisions. For the first time, it is clearly defined that national defense mobilization is an activity that "responds to threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security and development interests", ensuring rapid transition between peacetime and wartime, and transforming economic and social strength into national defense strength.
The law expressly stipulates that when responding to the above threats, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress can decide on nationwide mobilization or partial mobilization. Among them, "development interests" is a reason for mobilization that was not mentioned in the old version, but the regulations do not clearly define what "development interests" are.
Hong Pu-chao, deputy executive director of the Mainland China and Regional Development Research Center at Tunghai University in Taiwan, told DW that the core of this law revision is to elevate national defense mobilization to the level of war mobilization for the entire country. For example, Article 3 of the National Defense Mobilization Law clearly lists "national participation" and "long-term preparation."
He pointed out that the inclusion of "development interests" in the starting conditions for national defense mobilization is an important change in this revision of the law. Since the scope of "development interests" is very wide and can involve economic security, energy, technology, industrial chains, supply chains, and important maritime transportation, and whether the threat is established is determined by the Chinese party, government, and military systems, this gives greater room for political discretion in the launch of national defense mobilization.
In addition to increasing the reasons for national defense mobilization, under the new legislation, national defense mobilization covers a wider range of industries, and data, network security, advanced technology and emerging fields are officially included in the national defense mobilization system for the first time.
Zhuang Jiaying, associate professor at the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, told DW that the focus of the law amendment is to incorporate high technology into national defense mobilization, especially due to the impact of the U.S.-China technology war. The CCP has for some time regarded high technology as closely related to national security. "(The law amendment) is a formal way to inform different industries and technical personnel how they need to cooperate under what conditions."
This revision of the law involves promoting high-tech development, with a new Article 8 “promoting the application of advanced technologies in national defense mobilization and developing national defense mobilization forces in emerging fields.” He analyzed that the CCP may hope to control the development and flow of industries, more clearly define the scope of cooperation between enterprises and foreign countries, and even absorb foreign technologies.
Why amend the law at this time?
China has been planning to amend the National Defense Mobilization Law for many years.
In 2021, in order to cooperate with the deepening of the reform of the national defense mobilization system, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decided to "temporarily adjust the application" of some provisions of the "National Defense Mobilization Law" and other relevant laws, which means suspending the scope of application of some old laws and stating that "when the reform measures mature, relevant laws will be revised and improved in a timely manner."
In 2022, Liu Ruiqiang, an associate professor at the School of Law and National Security College of China University of Political Science and Law, wrote a paper pointing out that with the rapid changes in the social, economic, and security environment, the existing "National Defense Mobilization Law" has seriously lagged behind the development of theory and practice. When the law is too general, regulations can easily fall into the dilemma of "zombie clauses."
On April 27 this year, the revised draft of the National Defense Mobilization Law was submitted to the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress for its first review. China's official media "Xinhua News Agency" described that some provisions of the original law were no longer suitable for the "new situation" of national defense mobilization and needed to be revised and improved. On August 28, the newly revised "National Defense Mobilization Law" was voted and passed.
Political scientist Hong Puzhao analyzed that this revision of the law puts national defense mobilization ahead of peacetime. For example, Article 26 incorporates the statistical survey of national defense mobilization potential into the government statistical survey system and establishes a dynamic update mechanism. This means that in peacetime, China must understand where the various resources that can be invested in national defense mobilization are distributed and who controls them, and how to quickly engage in war when necessary.
He described the new law as accelerating the efficiency of war preparations. "China is shifting wartime mobilization forward to peacetime preparations, allowing the entire country to enter a state of war faster when needed."
The outside world is paying attention to whether the timing of this revision of the law was affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. Hong Puzhao pointed out that China has been adjusting its national defense mobilization system for many years, and it is difficult to attribute the completion of the law amendment in 2026 solely to a certain war. However, a comprehensive review of the Russia-Ukraine war and regional wars in recent years does provide China with a large amount of practical experience in observing modern wars.
"Especially after the Russo-Ukrainian war entered a long period of consumption, military industrial production capacity, ammunition and equipment replenishment, supply chain, digital communications, transportation and logistics, energy and medical care have all become important factors affecting the war situation. These experiences are highly consistent with the direction of this revision of the law."
He pointed out that this revision of the law requires the establishment of a strategic material reserve system, an increase in physical, technical and production capacity reserves, and the establishment of a mobilization system for military scientific research, production and maintenance support. China is building the ability to support large-scale wars and long-term consumption. "China's strengthening of national defense mobilization is also to prepare for how the entire country can sustain itself after a protracted war, and to avoid further military failure turning into a regime crisis."
Does the law target Taiwan?
The new version of the National Defense Mobilization Law does not explicitly mention Taiwan, but it has attracted Taiwan's attention.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party's Legislative Yuan caucus stated at the end of August that Taiwan's biggest threat is China. When China writes the transition from peacetime to war into law, it will be able to mobilize various resources in society to prepare for military operations. Taiwan should strengthen its overall defense resilience. Kuomintang legislator Li Yanxiu believes that the declarative significance of the law is greater than its substantive significance. Taiwan must strengthen its national defense and combat readiness and continue to promote cross-strait peace and exchanges.
Scholar Zhuang Jiaying pointed out that China's pressure on Taiwan has been increasing. This law has given China's party and government machinery an additional tool, but the overall direction towards Taiwan has not changed, and Taiwanese society and government have already begun to make relevant preparations.
Scholar Hong Puzhao believes that this revision of the law is not specifically targeted at Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait is just one of the potential military conflicts China faces. For example, the maritime conflict with the Philippines in the South China Sea affects the US-Philippines military alliance; there has been a long-term territorial and military confrontation on the China-India border, and both sides are nuclear-armed countries; the Diaoyutai (called Senkaku Islands in Japan) dispute in the East China Sea involves Japan and is also connected to the US-Japan security system.
He believes that the scale of war prepared by this system exceeds the Taiwan Strait itself. "Once a military conflict occurs in these areas, there is a risk of expanding the scale and involving other countries to intervene. The situation in the Taiwan Strait is more complicated. Once China launches a large-scale aggressive war against Taiwan, and the United States, Japan or other countries intervene, the war may expand from the Taiwan Strait to the Western Pacific, or even evolve into a high-intensity military conflict between China and the United States."
The embarrassing situation of Taiwanese businessmen
Some scholars pointed out that the newly revised National Defense Mobilization Law has put Taiwanese businessmen operating in mainland China into an embarrassing situation.
The regulations stipulate that after national defense mobilization is implemented, when the reserve materials cannot meet the mobilization needs in time, the people's governments at or above the county level may "expropriate" or "requisition" civilian resources in accordance with the law, and may transform them according to military needs. If the company refuses, delays or obstructs, the government will order it to make corrections within a time limit; if it fails to make corrections within the time limit, it will be forced to perform its obligations and may be fined.
It is worth noting that the old law only "requisitioned" civilian resources, and specified that the government should promptly return them after use, or provide compensation according to regulations. The new law adds "expropriation" of civilian resources, and there is no provision for return of "expropriation". It only stipulates that if direct economic losses are caused by expropriation, fair and reasonable compensation will be given.
Political scientist Zhuang Jiaying pointed out that Taiwanese business associations in China are stuck between the legal structures of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. If they cooperate with China's National Defense Mobilization Law, they may violate Taiwan's National Security Law and Anti-infiltration Law.
"The embarrassing situation of Taiwanese businessmen is more prominent, but it is the same for any foreign businessman. If you are a foreign businessman or have a joint venture in China, and the Chinese government requires mobilization, you also need to cooperate, whether you are a Japanese company, a Korean company, an American company, a European company, etc. Therefore, it has a wide range of (influence) and regards the entire society and economy as its national defense and national security resources."
On September 2 this year, some Taiwanese media asked Zhang Han, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China, whether the assets and technologies of Taiwanese businesses in the mainland are subject to the "expropriation" clause in the new law. Zhang Han replied that the law aims to safeguard "national security and development interests." There are clear legal requirements and statutory procedures for the expropriation and expropriation of civilian resources during national defense mobilization. He emphasized that there is "no need to worry" about Taiwanese businesses and Taiwanese companies operating in compliance with the law in the mainland.
The Central News Agency, which has a semi-official background in Taiwan, quoted an unnamed Taiwanese national security source as saying that the purpose of the amendment is to "absolutely integrate China's internal resources." In addition to military mobilization against Taiwan itself, the amendment will increase the political and economic risks of Taiwanese businessmen operating in China, resulting in the possibility of expropriation at any time.
Political scientist Hong Puzhao analyzed that Article 64 of the National Defense Mobilization Law stipulates that any organization or individual has the obligation to cooperate with the expropriation. He believes that Taiwanese businessmen have no special exemption, and the new law also requires relevant companies to undertake tasks such as strategic material warehousing, transportation and distribution. Once China launches national defense mobilization, the assets, equipment, production capacity and logistics capabilities of Taiwanese businessmen will be included in the wartime mobilization system.
Another political meaning of “mobilization”
Scholars point out that "mobilization" has political implications beyond war.
Political scientist Zhuang Jiaying analyzed that in the Chinese Communist Party’s view of history, “mobilization” often carries a vision for national development. “For example, we see that the Great Leap Forward was also a kind of mobilization, the Cultural Revolution was also a kind of mobilization, and even reform and opening up sometimes had descriptions of mobilizing the country and society. So this kind of mobilization is not limited to war, but is the strategic direction of the entire country.”
He believes that the entire law can also be interpreted from the perspective of long-term competition between China and the United States. If China wants to continue to compete with the United States as a major power, it will need to use different social and economic resources. "Mobilization" has the meaning of improving overall national strength and national security. "It (the National Defense Mobilization Law) relaxes the definition of national security, and there are more reasons to require different industries to cooperate with different policies."
Zhuang Jiaying pointed out that from Deng Xiaoping to the years when Hu and Wen were in power, people could be "mobilized" for national interests, but they tried not to touch too many parts of the private market economy. After Xi Jinping came to power, the boundaries between the private market and national security have become blurred again, and different categories have been gradually included in national security. "In the Mao (Zedong) era, there was also such a way of interpreting and handling society, so it has a bit of a Mao era flavor."
