Lula faces a drop in approval and a technical tie with Flávio Bolsonaro in the second round

What could Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's (PT) candidacy do given the facts that his government's assessment has been steadily worsening since July and that he is in practice tied with Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) in the second round? What else will come in this election amid the mud of the legal-police war? Alexandre de Moraes and André Mendonça are on the verge of legal action, a duel, the Supreme Court and much more. It’s difficult to know what the electorate will make of this.

What will PT-Lulism do? Expect a deadly leak from a police investigation that will harm the right-wing and far-right candidacy? Hoping that the repeated reminder of Flávio's track record will convince some "neither-nor" voters? The Bolsonaro-Vorcaro effect has passed. Would Lula finally have a new speech to make that wouldn't sound like opportunism? For four years, there was no new speech.

All social benefit programs in cash, tax reductions and credit facilitation have been in force, some for years or since the beginning of 2026 (such as the IR exemption for those earning up to R$5,000). Does Lulismo think it can gain a couple of percentage points of votes by remembering on TV, radio and other campaign media that it did this or that? Maybe a couple of points. Perhaps, simply, because the government's assessment is towards Lula 3's rock bottom. It is the same as that of the defeated candidate for re-election Jair Bolsonaro in 2022.

Lula's evaluation one month before the first round is in practice the second worst of this term. It only surpasses the rock bottom of February 2025 (24% "great/good", 41% "bad/terrible", negative balance of 17 points). Remember once again that New Year's Eve was a time of peak annual food inflation (8.4% in November 2024, 7.1% in February 2025), the financial panic of December-February (dollars rose to R$6, rising interest rates) and the lie that propagated the idea that Lula would charge taxes on Pix.

At this point in the campaign, in 2014, Dilma Rousseff had a weak but positive rating, with a balance of 12 points (36% "excellent/good" and 24% "bad/terrible"). Lula now has 31% "excellent/good" and 42% "bad/terrible", a negative balance of 11 points, the exact same situation as Jair Bolsonaro at the beginning of the pre-election September 2022.

Lula's score is only positive among voters with an income equal to or less than two minimum wages, and by a small margin (39% "excellent/good" compared to 33% "bad/terrible"). In the "middle class" categories of the Datafolha sample (two to five minimum wages), there is 23% "excellent/good" and 50% "bad/terrible", almost absolute majority disapproval.

In the case of Jair Bolsonaro in 2022, his government's assessment would worsen slightly from September to the eve of the first round, remaining at 31% "excellent/good" and dropping to 44% "bad/terrible". His vote would increase from 34% in the voting intention survey at the beginning of September to 41.3% in the first round at the polls.