The statistics clearly show that the rise of the AfD does not coincide with economic decline, but with a decline in unemployment. Where the labor market is developing best, the right is particularly strong. However, that does not mean that the economy does not have an important influence on voting behavior.
Economic development, especially unemployment, is often at the center of explanations for the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism. However, research has a problem with the seemingly coherent idea that job losses due to structural change and deindustrialization make voters receptive to populist politics. The rise of the AfD in Germany cannot be explained by this. In fact, the statistical connection between electoral successes of the right-wing party and the development of unemployment in East Germany is sometimes even negative.
But does that mean that economic development plays no role at all in the rise of right-wing populism? And conversely, a well-performing economy and a decline in unemployment do not offer an approach to pushing back populists and stabilizing democracy? Researchers at the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research in Halle in Saxony-Anhalt conducted an analysis to examine the question "why it appears to be communities with particularly positive developments in the labor market in which the AfD is achieving increasingly strong election results." To do this, they compared the results of the federal elections from 2013 to 2025 at the regional level with the development of unemployment and income (average daily wages). The AfD's record election result in the state elections in Saxony-Anhalt is not part of the analysis.
If you look at the development of these parameters over time, the statistical connection is clear: "The share of votes for the AfD (has) risen sharply, particularly in those regions that can look back on extremely positive developments in their labor markets, for example in eastern Germany." According to the study authors, this is only an “apparent contradiction” to the assumption that the economy plays an important role in the success of populists. In their analysis, the researchers not only look at the development of the labor market in each municipality individually, but also “in cross-section”, that is: where does it lie in a Germany-wide comparison.
The researchers note, for example, that the regions where the initial situation in 2013 was particularly poor recorded the greatest decline in unemployment. At the same time, however, these improvements were not enough to catch up with or even overtake strong regions. The ten percent of the structurally weakest regions had an average unemployment rate of 13.5 percent in 2013. By 2021 it had fallen to just 4.8 percent. In the ten percent of the strongest municipalities, however, unemployment was only two percent in 2013 and fell slightly to 1.6 percent in 2021.
The “level differences” have reduced, but the “difference in the ranking” has remained, the researchers state. Even if the situation on the labor market has improved, regions that have been left behind have remained behind. And the AfD is particularly attractive to voters there. For the AfD's success, it is not the local situation per se that is crucial, but rather "the long-term relative socio-economic position of a community within a pan-German comparison." According to the authors, this finding fits with findings from other research, according to which "relative comparisons of one's own position to the overall average are of central importance for support for right-wing populist parties."
If you want to counter populism in terms of economic policy, it is not enough to point to improvements in the labor market. According to the analysis, it is crucial to change the long-standing regional differences. “Regional policy should address this directly.”
