The election result in Saxony-Anhalt is likely to exacerbate the CDU's dilemma, says political scientist Oliver Lembcke in an interview. Because the entire party system is shifting.
Berlin. More than 40 percent for the AfD, the CDU far behind: such a result in the state elections in Saxony-Anhalt would be a “tectonic shift” in the party system for the Bochum political scientist Oliver Lembcke.
The AfD would go from being an outsider to becoming the dominant pole. This would have far-reaching consequences, especially for the CDU. The reason for this is that the other established parties have neglected the battle over political emotions and social media for too long.
Mr. Lembcke, if the AfD actually reaches more than 40 percent in Saxony-Anhalt: what would that mean?
We are not simply experiencing another electoral success for the AfD, but rather a tectonic shift in the party system. There are signs of a change in political dominance in Saxony-Anhalt. If the AfD reaches more than 40 percent and leaves the CDU behind by almost 20 percentage points, this is no longer a normal shift between two competitors. A party that has long been on the fringes of the party system becomes its dominant pole.
What does this mean for the formation of a government?
As the balance of power changes, the rules for forming a government also change. The larger a party becomes that the others do not want to form a coalition with, the more difficult it becomes for these parties to form stable majorities among themselves.
The firewall actually has not only a moral or strategic effect, but also a very practical, arithmetic effect: the stronger the AfD becomes, the more complicated the government models on the other side become.
The real lesson from Saxony-Anhalt could be: transition to a new party system. Its characteristics are a weakened political center, the erosion of the traditional popular parties and an AfD whose strength is changing the formation of the majority and thus the functioning of the parliamentary system.
A result of more than 40 percent cannot be reduced to either protest or right-wing extremism. Both are part of the explanation, but neither is sufficient. Anyone who reaches more than four out of ten voters mobilizes a much broader and more heterogeneous electorate.
A significant number now vote for the AfD out of conviction: because they share their positions on migration, internal security or socio-political issues, because they believe they can bring about a fundamental change in policy, or because the AfD has become their preferred political representative. In some cases, protest voting has turned into positive party loyalty.
It is precisely in this integrative function that the AfD differs significantly from the classic popular parties. I would therefore rather speak of a regional dominant party with a voter base similar to that of a people's party.
What is actually remarkable is the reversal of the situation: the CDU is no longer the major integration party against which the AfD is making a name for itself as a protest party. The AfD itself has become the dominant pole, while the CDU is fighting for its former position.
The errors go further than individual decisions in migration, economic or social policy. For years, the established parties have left the wide field of political emotions to populism. That was a fundamental mistake.
Politics was never just a rational debate about factual issues. It always has to do with belonging, recognition, hope, pride, fear or trust in the future. This is even more true in times of affective polarization and identity political conflicts.
Democratic parties must once again be able to convey an idea of what is politically worth fighting for. A second omission is directly related to this: the established parties have long conducted the battle over social media with astonishing negligence. Today, political perceptions are shaped there, conflicts come to a head and feelings of community are created.
The AfD understood early on that social media is not simply an additional communication channel, but rather its own political space. Anyone who is not present there or only translates press releases into a new medium leaves the interpretation of reality to others.
An inability to explain their own policies is rampant in the established parties. This is not about selling unpopular policies with better marketing. Anyone who is convinced of a political project must be able to say what problem they want to solve with it, what burdens are associated with it and why they still think it is right. Politics needs justification.
When politicians can no longer justify their own decisions in understandable language, the impression arises that politics is either administered technocratically or enforced against the citizens. Parties also need to rethink their recruitment of political personnel. Party political experience and loyalty remain important. But they should not be the decisive selection criteria.
In a mediatized and personalized democracy, the ability to reach people, establish trust and credibly embody political ideas counts at least as much. You can also use the old-fashioned sounding word “charisma” for this.
It would be read as an interim report for the black-red federal government. The pressure to act would increase significantly, in terms of the economy, migration, the welfare state and, above all, the question of whether the state is still able to actually solve identifiable problems.
The problem is: election defeats increase the pressure on the Union and SPD to raise their profile. This can make shared governance more difficult. Black and red can increasingly less afford political failure.
If, despite the Union's significantly more conservative course, especially in migration policy, the AfD gets more than 40 percent and leaves the CDU far behind, the previous strategy will be put to the test.
The CDU's real problem lies in how it wants and can govern behind the firewall. The stronger the AfD becomes, the smaller the space for majorities without it becomes. Saxony-Anhalt could exacerbate this dilemma to the maximum.
The CDU does not want to work with the AfD, and it also rules out cooperation with the Left. However, it could still depend on votes from the left in order to be able to form a government and keep it able to act. This means that the firewall and the incompatibility decision are increasingly coming into tension. If you want to permanently maintain the firewall to the right, you will have to allow yourself more mobility to the left.
The CDU must turn the firewall into a justified border. She will have to say goodbye to the idea of being able to treat the AfD and the Left in mirror image. If parliamentary cooperation is to be possible with the Left but not with the AfD, it must justify this difference politically and normatively. The crucial question then becomes: What substantive boundaries do we draw for political cooperation – and why? Such justification also applies when the majority situation changes.
